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COMMENTS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LAW OF ANNULMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA-
EFFECT OF PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE.
Annulment has become a distinct title in modern law chiefly through
the agency of American courts and legislatures although its basic under-
lying concepts are ancient in the extreme.' In Pennsylvania, however,
annulment has become an almost forgotten procedure. Notwithstanding
the importance of the remedy both in theory and in practice, the cause
has been limited because of its grave results. Perhaps it has been restricted
by the practitioner as much as by the legislator. The purpose of this Com-
ment is to examine the law of annulment as it exists today in Pennsylvania,
and to evaluate the effect of the proposed Marriage Code 2 which is being
presented for legislative action. It is not within the scope of this Com-
ment to discuss, except incidentally, the law of divorce either as it pres-
ently exists or as proposed by the Divorce Code.
I.
ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE.
Annulment, as distinguished from divorce, is merely a declaration of
an existing status, i.e., it does not create a new relation nor sever a present
one.3 It presupposes the invalidity of the marriage contract and voids
it ab initio. Divorce, however, is predicated upon a valid marriage and
the contract is dissolved only from the date of the entry of the decree. 4
The decree of annulment, in declaring the non-existence of a marriage,
carries with it the bastardization of issue," the destruction of property
interests,6 and no award of permanent alimony. 7 For these reasons, many
1. See JAcoBs & GOEBEL, CASES ON DoMESTIC RELATIONS, 309 (3d ed. 1952).
2. All citations to the proposed codes within the Comment will be to the 1959
third drafts as recommended by the subcommittee on Domestic Relations Laws of
the Committee on Court Procedure and Administration and Domestic Relations Laws
of the Joint State Government Commission [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED MARRIAGE
CODE and PROPOSED DIVOR E CODE].
3. Faivre v. Faivre, 182 Pa. Super. 365, 128 A.2d 139 (1956); Commonwealth
ex rel. Knode v. Knode, 149 Pa. Super. 563, 27 A.2d 536 (1941) (dictum).
4. Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 105 Pa. Super. 30, 160 Atl. 228 (1932); Juliano v.
Juliano, 24 Pa. D. & C. 585 (C. P. Phila. 1934).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Courts have quite generally held that since an award of permanent alimony
depends upon the affirmance of the marriage, it cannot be incident to an annul-
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legislatures, including that of Pennsylvania, have chosen not to extend
the grounds for annulment and have shown a marked preference for di-
vorce. This has been done by making divorce available not only for post-
nuptial offenses but also for antenuptial impediments which rendered the
marriage void or voidable at common law." Theoretically, annulment
should apply to this latter category of impediments.
Some legislatures have recognized the importance of annulment and
have provided for both alimony and legitimation in such cases instead of
limiting the exercise of it.9 However, even in Pennsylvania where the cause
is not extended, the remedy still proves important despite its harsh con-
sequences. The procedure has several advantages over divorce which
should be. considered, especially where circumstances may permit either
remedy:
(1) There are no residence requirements in annulment proceedings,
whereas for divorce the libelant must be a bona fide domiciliary of the
Commonwealth for one year immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.' 0
(2) Since a decree of annulment is a judicial declaration that the
marriage was void ab initio, if is not necessary for the libelant to be an
"innocent or injured" party" as required for divorce.' 2
(3) The decree that a valid marriage never existed avoids the social,
religious and sometimes political connotations of being a "divorcee."
(4) It is desirable to get a final and conclusive declaration of in-
validity in order to avoid a subsequent collateral attack upon the marriage."3
(5) The particular impediment may not be one of the enumerated
grounds for divorce.14
ment. However, statutes in several jurisdictions have altered this rule. See JAcoBs
& GOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 366-67. The proposed Pennsylvania Marriage
Code contains such a change. It has been held, however, that the present Pennsyl-
vania statute which provides for an award of alimony pendente lite together with
reasonable counsel fees and expenses in the case of divorce also applies to pro-
ceedings for annulment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (1955). See Stump v. Stump,
111 Pa. Super. 541, 170 Atl. 393 (1934).
8. In Pennsylvania, the following antenuptial impediments have been made grounds
for divorce: impotency, incapacity due to relationship (incestuous marriages), fraud
and duress. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955).
9. See JACOBS & GOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 311.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 23, §§ 15, 16 (1955).
11. Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948); Fitzpatrick v.
Miller, 129 Pa. Super. 324, 196 At. 83 (1937). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12
(1955) (". . . such supposed or alleged marriage, may upon the application of either
party be declared null and void. .. ").
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955). However, the proposed code eliminates
this requirement. See PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 10, comment.
13. Reader, The Annulment of Marriages in Pennsylvania, 41 DICK. L. REv. 37,
38 (1936-37).
14. "The only causes for divorce in this State are specified by statute, and they
cannot be expanded to meet causes that are not clearly embraced in the words used
in the statute. . . ." Cantor v. Cantor, 70 Pa. Super. 108, 111 (1918).
[VOL. 4
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II.
VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES.
The distinction between void and voidable marriages is part of the
common law derived from England.' 5 It proves important in Pennsylvania
today primarily because of the present annulment statute to be discussed
below. Under the common law, a voidable marriage is one between parties
having capacity to contract for marriage but in the constitution of which
there is an imperfection, which gives one or both of the parties a choice
either of treating it as valid or of rendering it invalid by an annulment
proceeding.' 6 It is valid until disaffirmed and thus is entitled to recognition
until directly attacked, although even a direct attack will fail after the
death of one of the parties.' 7 When annulled, however, the marriage is
up-rooted ab initio.1'
At common law the following marriages were recognized as voidable:
where one or both of the parties were under the age of consent ;19 where
the marriage was incestuous ;20 where one of the parties was impotent ;21
and by most jurisdictions, where consent was induced by fraud 22 or ob-
tained by duress.23 In a situation where a party was under the age of
consent or where a marriage was incestuous either party could avoid it;
in all other voidable marriages only the innocent party could annul.
2 4
15. See Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. 309 (1863). The origin of the distinction is
described in Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392, 393 (1872): "At common law there were
two kinds of disabilities affecting the validity of the marriage relation. The first
was termed canonical, depending on the -law of the church and enforced in the
ecclesiastical court. Among these were consanquinity and affinity. These causes
rendered marriage voidable only, and it was necessary that the nullity should be
declared during the lifetime of the parties, otherwise they were and continued valid
for all civil purposes. The second kind was civil disabilities, such as a prior marriage,
infancy, idiocy, lunacy, fraud or force. 'These made the contract void, ab unitio, and
the union meretricious. In such cases no sentence of nullity or degree of divorce
was required but at all times, whether during the lifetime of the parties or after-
wards, the marriage might be considered and treated as null and void."
16. See Reader, supra note 13, at 38.
17. See FREEDMAN, MARRIAGE AND DIVORC9 IN PENNSYLVANIA § 6 (2d ed. 1957).
18. Ibid.
19. See Lawler, Marital Status and Annulment in Pennsylvania, 4 PITT. L. Rev.
251, 268 (1938) ; Reader, supra note 13, at 39. The common-law age of consent was
twelve for girls and fourteen for boys. As Pennsylvania has no statutory age of
consent, the common-law rules govern. Greene v. Brandt, 13 Pa. D. & C. 712 (C.P.
Luz. 1930).
20. Boylan v. Deinzer, 45 N.J. Eq. 485, 18 Atl. 119 (1889) ; Parker's Appeal, 44
Pa. 309 (1863).
21. Anonymous, 89 Ala. 291, 7 So. 100 (1889) ; G. v. G., 67 N.J. Eq. 30, 56 Atl.
736 (1904).
22. In re DeConza's Estate, 13 N.J. Misc. 41, 176 Atl. 192 (1934) ; Shonfeld v.
Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933); Allen v. Allen, 126 W. Va. 415, 28
S.E.2d 829 (1944). See Kingsley, Fraud as a Ground for Annulment of Marriage' 18
So. CAL. L. REv. 213, 236 (1944-45).
23. Mason v. Mason, 164 Ark. 59, 261 S.W. 40 (1924) ; Tyson v. State, 83 Fla.
7, 90 So. 622 (1922); Johnson v. Sands, 245 Ky. 529, 53 S.W.2d 929 (1932);
Doseher v. Schroder, 105 N.J. Eq. 315, 147 Atl. 781 (1929).
24. See Reader, supra note 13, at 39.
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Also, except in the case of incestuous marriages, the defect could be cured
by the ratification of the innocent party.25
A void marriage is one which has never been valid. It may be at-
tacked directly or in a collateral proceeding and even after the death of
one of the parties. No judicial pronouncement is required to deprive it
of vitality. 26 Thus, the parties are free to marry again without any such
decree.2 7 Generally, void marriages fall into two classifications: (1) lack
of consent of one or both of the parties, and (2) incapacity of one or both
of the parties imposed by public policy. The various types of void mar-
riages within these categories will be considered below in connection with
the present Pennsylvania statute.
III.
RELEVANT STATUTES.
Annulment in Pennsylvania is based entirely upon statutory authority
and there is no general equity jurisdiction over the subject s.2  Prior to
1935, bigamy was the only ground for annulment in Pennsylvania.2 9 How-
ever, in 1935, the legislature broadened the grounds for annulment to
include not only void bigamous marriages but also all marriages which for
any other legal cause were absolutely void when contracted:
"In all cases where a supposed or alleged marriage shall have been
contracted, which is absolutely void by reason of one of the parties
thereto having a spouse living at the time of the supposed or alleged
marriage, or, if for any other reason, the supposed or alleged marriage
was absolutely void when contracted, such supposed or alleged mar-
riage, may upon the application of either party be declared null and
void. . .. ,, 30 (Emphasis supplied).
As the amendment was originally introduced in the House, it also em-
braced voidable marriages but they were deleted from the bill in Senate
committee.31 The companion bill, however, amending the venue provisions
in annulment actions, also contained a reference to voidable marriages
but through an oversight this was not deleted and was enacted as follows:
"Petitions for libels for the annulment of void or voidable marriages [The
venue provisions follow] .... ,, 32 (Emphasis supplied). Courts 33 and
25. Ibid. See Hampstead v. Plaistow, 49 N.H. 84 (1869) (marriage under duress
ratified) ; G. v. G., 67 N.J. Eq. 30, 56 Atl. 736 (1904) (ratified impotency).
26. See FRMDMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 6.
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Knode v. Knode, 149 Pa. Super. 563, 27 A.2d 536
(1941).
28. Pitcairn v. Pitcairn, 201 Pa. 368, 50 At. 963 (1902) ; Eisenberg v. Eisenberg,
105 Pa. Super. 30, 160 Atl. 228 (1932).
29. Pa. Laws 1929, act 1237, § 12.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (1955).
31. Reader, supra note 13, at 45.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 15 (1955).
33. See, e.g., Faivre v. Faivre, 182 Pa. Super. 365, 128 A.2d 139 (1957)
Brennen v. Brennen, 80 Pa. D. & C. 90 (C.P. Fay. 1952) ; Chamberlain v. Chamber-
[VOL. 4
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text writers3 4 have been almost unanimous in holding inoperative the
reference to voidable marriages in the venue section as that section is pro-
cedural only, the other section being the substantive one, conferring power
to grant annulments. There conclusion is that the power to annul exists
only where the marriage was absolutely void when contracted and it does
not extend to marriages which are merely voidable. However, the in-
consistency has merited attention and some writers have put significance
on its mere existence.3 5
Statutory inconsistency is not the only problem raised. If annulment
procedures apply only to void marriages, what remedy is available to the
parties of a marriage which was voidable at common law and is not sub-
ject to statutory divorce? This problem would be raised in a marriage
where one or both of the parties is below the age of consent. There seems
to be no procedure available to dissolve such a marriage, which appears
to be the only voidable marriage which is not one of the statutory grounds
for divorce. This is another reason why the argument has been made
that voidable marriages can also be annulled.38 Several other solutions
have been tendered. One suggestion is that either party could, when the
one under the age of consent reached the required age, disaffirm the re-
lation and thus render it void ab initio. Then, since the marriage was
void from the beginning, either party could bring annulment proceed-
ings.3 7 In addition, there may also appear elements of fraud or duress
which would afford a basis for divorce on that ground, or it may be found
that the infant involved did not appreciate the significance of the marriage
relation and consequently did not consent thereto, which would have the
effect of rendering the marriage void rather than voidable, so that relief
could be obtained through annulment proceedings.38 None of these sug-
gestions seems to substitute satisfactorily for the absence of an express
statutory provision which seemingly is wanting through a legislative
oversight.
IV.
GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT.
Assuming, and apparently correctly so, that only those marriages
which are absolutely void at their inception can be annulled in Pennsyl-
vania and that voidable marriages are not capable of being so set aside, it
lain, 45 Pa. D. & C. 659 (C.P. Blair 1942); Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159
(C.P. Phila. 1942).
34. FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 375; LEVIN, SUMMARY OF PA. JURIS-
PRUDENcE-DoMeSTIc RELATIONS § 39 (1954); Lawler, supra note 19, at 271; Reader,
supra note 13, at 44-45.
35. Brown & Porta, A Survey of the Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsyl-
vania, 23 TEMP. L. Q. 371, 389-90 (1949-50).
36. Ibid. The authors suggest that an annulment can be had if there has been
no cohabitation so as to invoke unfavorable public policy against an annulment.
37. See Reader, supra note 13, at 44.
38. LEVIN, op. cit. supra note 34, § 51.
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would be proper to consider what marriages have been or apparently
could be annulled under the present statute. It will not be necessary to
discuss all the ramifications of each impediment but only the broad notions
which render the marriage void.
A.
Lack of Consent.
Mutual consent is a necessary element to validate any contract and
since the status of marriage is reached through contract, it must derive
its validity from the consent of the parties thereto. 9 If for some reason
one or both parties do not consent, the marriage is usually held to be
absolutely void in its inception. 40
(1) Mental Incapacity.
A license of marriage will not be issued to an applicant known to be
insane.41 However, if a marriage is contracted when either of the parties
is insane, it will be held totally void.4 2 This was true even though such
a marriage could not be annulled prior to 193543 as it could be attacked
collaterally. 4
4
Every variation from a normal mental condition is not sufficient to
avoid a marriage contract. The test is "whether at the precise time of the
marriage the party had sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of
the contract and relation into which he was entering." 4 Mere weakness
of memory, peculiarities, mental delusions, or want of capacity to manage
a business will not suffice. 46 Evidence of seizures of fainting and irrational
talk has also been held insufficient to establish mental incompetency at
the time of marriage. 47
Until recently there was some question whether a marriage void by
reason of insanity was subject to annulment because of procedural pro-
visions which indicated that the insane spouse was without capacity to sue
or be sued in such an action.48 However, a recent case has held that
39. Commonwealth v. Gamble, 36 Pa. Super. 146 (1908).
40. "A purported marriage lacking such an element as consent of the parties
is, unless some statutory provision governs, void, and needs no decree of the court
to make it so." Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 175 Ati. 574, 576 (1934).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (d), (e) (Supp. 1957).
42. In re Newlin's Estate, 231 Pa. 312, 80 Atl. 255 (1911) ; Nonnemacher v.
Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 28 At. 439 (1894); Zisser v. Zisser, 60 Pa. D. & C. 21
(C.P. Dauph. 1947) (dictum); Neff v. Neff, 9 D. & C. 88 (C.P. Dauph. 1926).
43. See Neff v. Neff, 9 Pa. D. & C. 88 (C.P. Dauph. 1926) (marriage of imbecile
held null and void but not subject to annulment).
44. See In re Newlin's Estate, 231 Pa. 312, 80 Atd. 255 (1911), where wife
attacked validity of her marriage to her second husband on ground of insanity in
probate of the will of her first husband which left legacy to her if she remained
unmarried.
45. Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 637 (1894).
46. Ibid.
47. Zisser v. Zisser, 60 Pa. D. & C. 21 (C.P. Dauph. 1947) (dictum).
48. See FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, §§ 504, 505.
[VOL. 4
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the remedy of annulment is available against an insane defendant, declar-
ing that a different result would be "unreasonable and absurd, and it cer-
tainly is one which the Legislature did not intend." 49 Since annulment is
available to one whether he be an innocent and injured spouse or not, the
same reasoning would seem to permit an annulment on behalf of an insane
plaintiff.50
Intoxication at the time of the marriage of such an extent as to
destroy one's mental capacity to contract will also void the marriage
for want of consent.5 1
(2) In Jest.
Where there is apparent mutual consent but both parties know that
the acts performed are without the substance of intention to contract, no
contract will be formed. 52 However, mere mental reservation by one of
the parties cannot destroy the consent which is manifested and void the
marriage. 53 The most common example of marriages effected in this way
are those entered into in jest.
Where the parties purport to celebrate a marriage in a spirit of jest
or play, there is no valid marriage.54 Such a marriage is capable of annul-
ment55 or collateral attack.56 This also seems to be the prevailing rule
in other jurisdictions.5 7
Cases where neither party intended a marriage must be carefully
distinguished from those where there was an intent to marry but only for
some limited purpose or time. Generally, these situations include marriages
to legitimize a child" or solely to obtain some other advantage from a
49. Faivre v. Faivre, 182 Pa. Super. 365, 371, 128 A.2d 139, 143 (1956).
50. FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 504.
51. Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. 243 (1858). See Lupinacci v. Lupinacci, 42 Pa.
D.&C. 429, 430 (C.P. Phila. 1941), where a marriage entered into while in a
drunken stupor was annulled as "one at least of the parties was not possessed of his
reason and utterly failed to understand the nature and consequences of his acts, and
was therefore without contractual capacity." Contra Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,
45 Pa. D.&C. 659, 660 (C.P. Blair 1942), wherein an annulment of a marriage
allegedly contracted while both parties were under the influence of intoxicating
liquor was refused under the statute because the marriage was "voidable only."
52. RPSTATEMEN'r, CONTRACrS § 71 (c) (1932).
53. Barnett v. Kimmell, 35 Pa. 13 (1859).
54. See LFVIN, op. cit. supra note 34, § 30.
55. Lannamann v. Lannamann, 171 Pa. Super. 147, 89 A.2d 897 (1952) (by
implication) ; Lupinacci v. Lupinacci, 42 Pa. D. & C. 429 (C.P. Phila. 1941) (dictum)
Porter v. Cook, 31 Del. 277 (C.P. Pa. 1932).
56. Osterling's Estate, 323 Pa. 23, 25, 185 Atl. 790, 791 (1936). Wife attempted
to take against her husband's will claiming to be his common-law wife, but the
election was set aside because, although the appropriate words may have been
used, the parties never looked upon the ceremony "save in a frivolous light" and
never had any intentions of becoming man and wife.
57. Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 175 Atl. 574 (1934) ; McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J.
Eq. 255 (1870); Meredith v. Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 122 S.E. 520 (1924).
Contra Hand v. Berry, 170 Ga. 743, 154 S.E. 239 (1930).
58. Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831 (1949) ; Stone v. Stone, 159
Fla. 624, 32 So. 2d 278 (1947) ; Conley v. Conley, 28 Ohio Op. 289 (1943) ; Campbell
v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784 (1939).
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marital status.59 There is some conflict in other jurisdictions, founded
mainly on the issue of mutual consent, as to the validity of these marriages.
Some hold that even though such marriages are legally performed, if
the parties do not intend to assume all the rights and obligations incident
thereto and do not intend to consummate it, the contract is lacking in
mutual consent and is void. 60 The majority view is that such marriages do
not lack mutual consent but are valid and incapable of annulment.6' The
Pennsylvania view would appear to conform to that of the majority62
notwithstanding one lower court decision to the contrary.6 3 Thus it seems
that a marriage for a limited purpose is a marriage for all purposes in
Pennsylvania.
(3) Fraud.
It would seem that, in the absence of controlling statutes to the con-
trary, a marriage contract to which the consent of one of the parties was
induced by fraud would be absolutely void since the element of mutual
consent is wholly lacking. However, the prevailing view elsewhere is
that such marriages are merely voidable.6 4 It may be that under the com-
mon law of Pennsylvania such a marriage is void.65 In either view, the
fraud necessary to avoid the marriage must go to the essentials of the
relationship. 66
59. E.g., United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945) (to gain
entrance into the country) ; DeVries v. DeVries, 195 Il1. App. 4 (1915) (to gain
release from employment contract) ; Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E.
673 (1934) (to retain a job and an increase in salary) ; Anonymous v. Anonymous,
49 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (only if subsequent religious ceremony would be
performed); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S 2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (to protect girl's
reputation); Dorgeloh v. Murtha, 92 Misc. 279, 156 N.Y.S. 181 (Sup. Ct. 1915)
(to secure theatrical engagement).
60. United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945); Stone v. Stone,
159 Fla. 624, 32 So. 2d 278 (1947); Dorgeloh v. Murtha, 92 Misc. 279, 156 N.Y.S.
181 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (elements of fraud and duress also present) ; Conley v. Conley,
28 Ohio Op. 289 (1943).
61. Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831 (1949); DeVries v. DeVries,
195 Ill. App. 4 (1915); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673 (1934);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49 N.Y.S.2d 314, (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Delfino v. Delfino,
35 N.Y.S. 2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784
(1939).
62. Lannamann v. Lannamann, 171 Pa. Super. 147, 89 A.2d 897 (1952) (trial
period without consummation); Perry v. Perry, 78 Pa. Super. 245 (1922) (to
evade draft) ; Proios v. Proios, 76 Pa. D. & C. 509 (C.P. Beaver 1951) (to gain
entrance into country) ; L. v. L., 67 Pa. D. & C. 391 (C.P. Lack. 1948) (to legitimize
child) ; Wagner v. Wagner, 59 Pa. D. & C. 90 (C.P. Chest. 1947) (same) ; Bove
v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (C.P. Phila. 1942) (same).
63. Osgood v. Moore, 38 Pa. D. & C. 263 (C.P. Tioga 1940) (to legitimize
child).
64. See cases cited note 22 supra.
65. See Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196, 199 (1881), where the court said, "[Bly
this language [of the statute providing for divorce for fraud] must of course be
understood such fraud as would at common law render a marriage void." See also
Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392 (1872).
66. Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196 (1881). This is the majority rule. The New
York rule is that every misrepresentation of a material fact, upon which there is
reliance, justifies an annulment. DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E.
63 (1903).
[VOL. 4
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Although fraud is a ground for annulment in most states, in Pennsyl-
vania it is a ground for divorce.67 The question arises whether an annul-
ment may also be obtained since the impediment may be said to render
the marriage totally void. There is some text68 and case69 authority allow-
ing this remedy in such a situation. However, most Pennsylvania cases
hold that the remedy of divorce must be pursued. 70 Perhaps the latter
view is the correct conclusion under the present statutes since it is probably
consistent with the intent of the legislature.
(4) Duress.
Where consent is obtained through the overpowering of the will by
force or threats of imminent violence, it would seem, perhaps even more
so than in the case of fraud, that the relation is tainted at its very source,
and should be totally void. Some of the early cases so held.7 ' But not-
withstanding the nature of the objection, the general rule, both under
statute and common law, is that the marriage is merely voidable.72 Sup-
port for either view can be found in Pennsylvania. 73
Pennsylvania has made marriages entered into through force or co-
ercion dissolvable by divorce. 74 Consequently, the same question arises as
under fraud, i.e., whether an annulment is also available. It is suggested
that under the present statute, divorce is the proper remedy.75
(5) Mistake.
Where there is a mistake as to the identity of the person76 or other
error which prevents the party from understanding the nature of the mar-
67. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(g) (1955).
68. Porta & Brown, supra note 35, at 390. The authors suggest that annulment
should be the remedy if the marriage has not been followed by cohabitation.
69. Snyder v. Snyder, 43 Pa. D. & C. 115 (C.P. Del. 1941) (fraudulent con-
cealment of epilepsy rendered marriage void and capable of annulment); Tomlinson
v. Tomlinson, 29 Pa. D. & C. 521 (C.P. Erie 1937) (although not sufficient fraud
was found, it was stated that had such fraud been found, an annulment could be
granted).
70. Barnett v. Kimmell, 35 Pa. 13 (1859) ; Proios v. Proios, 76 Pa. D. & C. 509
(C.P. Beaver 1951) ; Masciocchi v. Masciocchi, 72 Pa. D. & C. 257 (C.P. Phila. 1950) ;
Nice v. Nice, 71 Pa. D. & C. 167 (C.P. Mont. 1950) ; L. v. L., 67 Pa. D. & C. 391
(C.P. Lack. 1948). See FREEDMAN, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 14
(2d ed. 1957).
71. "Such marriage [through duress] has always been held void. . . . [T]he
mere fact of marriage without the consent of parties is of no validity. It is merely
and absolutely void. . . ." Mountholly v. Andover, 11 Vt. 226, 227-28 (1839). See
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 142 Ala. 571, 38 So. 640 (1904); Bassett v. Bassett, 9 Bush.
696 (Ky. 1873).
72. See cases cited note 23 supra.
73. To the effect that such a marriage is void, see Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392(1872). To the effect that such a marriage is voidable, see Richards v. Richards,
19 Pa. County Ct. 322 (C.P. Forrest 1896) (by implication).
74. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(g) (1955).
75. See FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 70 § 14. The cases cited at notes 69 and 70
supra would apparently include duress within their respective views as to whether
annulment is available for fraud. See Nice v. Nice, 71 Pa. D. & C. 167 (C.P. Mont.
1950) (dictum).
76. Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq. 11, 20 A.2d 325 (1941).
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riage,77 there is no mutual consent and the effect is to render the marriage
void. However, not every error or mistake will cause the contract to be
invalid. A mistake as to the name of one of the parties is insufficient,
78
as is a misapprehension as to personal traits or position in life. 79
Decisions based solely upon mistake are rare and there do not appear
to be any Pennsylvania cases on point. Perhaps this is because where
mistake occurs, there is also usually present some element of fraud or
duress. For example, where one party makes a fraudulent misrepresen-
tation, the other party is most likely mistaken as to this fact.80
Mistake is not included among the statutory grounds for divorce in
Pennsylvania although some states expressly provide for dissolution be-
cause of mistake.8 ' It is submitted that if there appears a case where the
mistake itself is of such a character as to destroy the reality of consent,
annulment is the proper remedy.
B.
Incapacity Imposed By Public Policy.
The state imposes upon some persons an incapacity to marry because
of certain policy reasons, most of which are expressed through statutory
prohibitions. When persons marry contrary to these policies, the marriage
will be held void.
(1) Parties Under the Age of Seven.
At common law, a marriage of one under the age of seven was totally
void and gave rise to no legal consequences whatsoever.8 2 The theory
behind the rule is sometimes stated to be that infants of such an age are
deemed utterly incapable of any consent, even provisional or imperfect.83
Perhaps then this category should be included under the heading of lack
of consent. However, it is submitted that the incapacity is imposed by a
public policy against such infant marriages rather than by a conclusive
presumption of incapacity to consent, where such consent in some instances
may actually be present.
77. See Fluharty v. Fluharty, 38 Del. 487, 193 At. 838 (1937) (dictum);
FREDMAN, Op cit. supra note 70, § 15.
78. Chapman v. Johnston, 237 Mass. 502, 130 N.E. 65 (1921).
79. ". . . [A] mistake, whether resulting from accident, or in general from
fraudulent practices, in respect to the character, fortune, health, or the like, does
not render void what is done." Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 303
N.Y. 506, 104 N.E.2d 877, 880 (1952). See also Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq.
11, 20 A.2d 325 (1941).
80. See Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 460 (1841).
81. See LA. CIVIL CODE tit. IV, ch. 4 art. 91 (1952). This article provides a
list of instances when consent to a marriage is considered not free, rendering such
capable of annulment: ".... 3. When there is a mistake respecting the person whom one
of the parties intended to marry." See Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847
(1948) (interpreting this provision).
82. FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 16; LEviN, op cit. supra note 34, § 17.
83. FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 16.
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Although there is no Pennsylvania authority on point (and obviously
the issue does not arise often), text writers are in accord that such a
marriage would be subject to annulment.8 4
(2) Adulterer-Paramour.
Prior to 1953, marriage, following a divorce for adultery, between the
adulterer and his corespondent during the lifetime of the innocent spouse
was affirmatively prohibited by a substantive statute.8 5 In 1953, the pro-
hibition was put in the form of a restriction upon the issuance of a license
in such a case.86 The policy behind such a restriction is that the sensi-
bilities of the innocent spouse should not be subjected to, nor public
decency affronted by, the witnessing of continued cohabitation by the
adulterous pair.87 Although it is normally done, the decree of divorce
for adultery need not contain the prohibition,88 but the record must show
adulterous conduct with the person who later becomes the adulterer's
second spouse.
8 9
An adulterer-paramour marriage in violation of the statute is abso-
lutely void and can be attacked by either party to it, both directly9° and
collaterally. 91 This is true even where the marriage was celebrated outside
the state in order to evade the restriction. 92 The older provision expressly
saved the legitimacy of issue of the marriage93 but this point is open to
conjecture under the 1953 act.94
(3) Bigamous Marriage.
"A man having a wife in full life is utterly powerless to make a valid
contract of marriage and his attempt to do so is utterly nugatory." 95 This
is a cardinal rule of jurisprudence in every monogamous society. Prior to
1935, bigamy was the sole ground for annulment in Pennsylvania 6 and
under the present statute it is the only express ground. 97
84. FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 375; LEVIN, op. cit. supra note 34 § 41;
Porta & Brown, supra note 35, at 389.
85. Pa. Laws 1815, act 150, 6 Smith's L. 286, § 9.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(h) (Supp. 1957).
87. See Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898). The theory behind the pro-
.hibition has also been expressed: ". . . [T]he adulterer should not enjoy the fruits
of his wrong. . . ." FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 24.
88. Braun v. Braun, 194 Pa. 287, 44 Atl. 1096 (1900).
89. Beegle's Estate, 64 Pa. Super. 180 (1916).
90. Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948) (by adulterer);
Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 Pa. D. & C. 195 (C.P. Susq. 1945) (by adulterer);
Higgins v. Higgins, 37 Pa. D. &. C. 268 (C.P. Mont. 1939) (by paramour).
91. Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 6 (1898) (administration of an estate)
Kennedy v. Orem, 15 Pa. Dist. 329 (C.P. Dauph. 1905) (ejectment action).
92. Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 6 (1898); Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa.
Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948).
93. Pa. Laws 1815, act 150, 6 Smith's L. 286,'§ 9.
94. See LEVIN, SUMMARY OV PA. JURISPRUDENcE-DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 19
(1954).
95. Heffner v. Heffner, 23 Pa. 104, 106 (1854).
96. Pa. Laws 1929, act 1237, § 12.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (1955).
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The second marriage is completely void and consequently can be
attacked in a collateral proceeding9" as well as by annulment. 99 However,
there are instances where such a marriage may become valid. A marriage
on a false rumor of death after a two year absence may subsequently
be validated upon the returning spouse seeking a divorce of his marriage
on the ground of bigamy. 100 Also, where a bigamous marriage is entered
into by one or both of the parties in good faith and they continue to co-
habit after the removal of the impediment, they will be held to be legally
married from that time on.1 1 However, if the inception of the relation
is known by both parties to be meretricious, continued cohabitation after
the removal of the impediment will not create a valid common-law mar-
riage in the absence of fresh verba de praesenti. 0 2
(4) Incestuous Marriage.
Prior to 1953, marriages between the prohibited degrees of consan-
quinity and affinity were "void to all intents and purposes" during the
lifetime of both parties, 0 3 notwithstanding they were subject to dissolution
by divorce. 0 4 Under this provision, some cases have held such marriages
subject to collateral attack 0 5 and also annulment'08 although the proper
remedy should have been divorce.10 7 However, in 1953,108 these marriages
expressly were made voidable only, necessitating the use of divorce as the
remedy.
V.
THE PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE.
The law of annulment in Pennsylvania would be completely revamped
by enactment of the proposed Marriage Code. There is a marked change
from a preference for divorce to a preference for annulment. This is
achieved substantially by the extension of the grounds for annulment to
98. E.g., Clark's Estate, 173 Pa. 451, 34 Atl. 68 (1896); Cline's Estate, 128 Pa.
Super. 309, 194 Att. 222 (1937).
99. E.g., DeRosay v. DeRosay, 162 Pa. Super. 333, 57 A.2d 685 (1948) ; Wagner
v. Wagner, 152 Pa. Super, 4, 30 A.2d 659 (1943).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(3) (1955).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-17 (Supp. 1957).
102. Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, 49 A. 2d 346 (1946) ; Hughes' Estate, 98 Pa.
Super. 328 (1929).
103. Pa. Laws 1815, act 150, 6 Smith's L. 286, § 5.
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(2) (1930).
105. United States ex rel. Devine v. International Navigation Co., 10 Pa. Dist. 480
(E.D. Pa. 1901) ; Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392 (1872) (dictum).
106. There is mostly dictum as authority for this point and even this would
seem to be the result of an apparent confusion of the terms "divorce" and "annul-
ment." See McCalmont v. McCalmont, 93 Pa. Super. 203 (1928) ; McClain v.
McClain, 40 Pa. Super. 248 (1909).
107. See FREEDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 70, § 167.
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-16 (Supp. 1957). There is also a restriction
against the issuance of licenses to applicants who are within the prohibited degrees.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(i) (Supp. 1957).
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include voidable as well as void marriages.10 9 The extension is justified
through the elimination of the grave consequences which previously flowed
from the avoidance of the relation ab initio: (1) the children of annulled
marriages are deemed legitimate;11O (2) the decree may provide for the
equitable adjustment of property rights between the parties;"' (3) the
court may award allowance for support when it is just and equitable
to do SO. 1 1 2
The distinction between void and voidable marriages is retained but
the distinction appears significant concerning only the availability of a
collateral attack.113 Not only have the grounds for annulment generally
been extended to include both void and voidable marriages, but some ante-
nuptial impediments which under the present law provide grounds for
divorce are included within these categories. The following marriages
are considered void and subject to annulment under the new law :114 (1)
bigamous; (2) incestuous (however, marriages within the degrees of
affinity are no longer prohibited 15 ) ; and (3) those involving lack of consent.
The following marriages are considered voidable and are also subject
to annulment :i16 (1) by a party under sixteen when not authorized by
court; (2) by a party between sixteen and twenty-one where there was
no parental consent; (3) where either party was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or narcotics; (4) where either of the parties is im-
potent; (5) where either party is induced to enter into the marriage by
fraud or duress; and (6) where the purpose of the marriage is frustrated
through no fault of the parties (i.e., either by the law or action of some
jurisdiction or by the impairment of the health of either party because of
the marriage).
The effect of the new code can be summarized as follows: Under the
present law, annulment applies only to void marriages (i.e., those void at
common law) while divorce is available not only for the postnuptial
offences (e.g. adultery, desertion, cruelty, etc.) but also for some ante-
nuptial impediments (in general those rendering a marriage voidable at
common law). There is no remedy provided for a non-age marriage
(parties below the age of consent). The new code simply makes all the
antenuptial impediments, including non-age, causes for annulment while
the grounds for divorce under the proposed law are limited to postnuptial
offences. 117
109. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 3-4.
110. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE §§ 3-3, 3-4.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 1-5 (a voidable marriage can only be questioned
in an annulment action; a void marriage is subject to collateral attack).
114. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 3-3.
115. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 2-20.
116. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 3-4.
117. See PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 10.
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VI.
CONCLUSION.
The proposed Marriage and Divorce Codes would bring a much needed
change in Pennsylvania family law-the extension of annulment to its
proper scope. In theory, a marriage which is invalid because of an im-
pediment which exists at the time of contracting should be subject to a
decree which declares such invalidity ab initio. However, many legislatures
would rather restrict annulment proceedings and favor divorce than elim-
inate the grave consequences which resulted from annulment at common
law. This is not a satisfactory solution. Some legislatures, in recognizing
the place of annulment, have preferred humanity to logic and have swept
away these harsh results. The proposed code will conform Pennsylvania
to this latter approach. In the meantime, however, annulment should not
be overlooked even in its restricted form in Pennsylvania. It is often a
desirable remedy, especially when no children are involved.
Donald G. Jewitt
PROPERTY-MARKETABILITY OF TAX TITLES-THE PENNSYLVANIA
REAL ESTATE TAX SALE ACT OF 1947.
When an attorney examining an abstract of title discovers a tax deed
in the grantor's chain of title that has not been perfected by the running
of the statute of limitations or some other remedial procedure, he gen-
erally will not pass such a title as marketable. Title insurance companies
are unwilling to insure a bare tax title that has not been strengthened by
supplemental proceedings to quiet title.
There is a general feeling among purchasers of land that a title based
on a tax deed is not marketable and that a purchase of such a title is the
purchase of a law suit.1 Courts in most jurisdictions are willing, even eager
to overthrow a tax title on the most technical of grounds. In addition,
the purchaser's apprehensions may be traced to several peculiarities in
Pennsylvania law, such as the fact that a tax sale does not divest the lien of
a mortgage which was perfected prior to the time the taxes became a lien
on the property and also to the distinction between seated and unseated
land and the different procedures for the sale of each. Since this distinc-
tion in the classification of lands is so important, it is profitable to discuss
it briefly at this point. Seated land is improved or cultivated land while
unseated land is uncultivated or unsettled. Originally, sale of the land
1. See 4 AMER. LAW OV PROPERTY § 18.67 (1952) ; FLzCT, TITLED ABSTRACT AND
PRACTICES §§ 610-16 (1951) ; PATTON, TITLES § 272 (1938).
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was the only method for enforcing tax assessments against unseated lands,
whereas in the case of seated lands the owner's personal property located
thereon could be sold to pay the taxes.
As the courts have found flaws in tax titles, the legislature has taken
steps to correct them. Statutes limiting the grounds for attack and vali-
dation statutes have been passed piecemeal until in 1947 Pennsylvania
passed a comprehensive act designed to eliminate most of the objections
which remained. This act is not universally applicable, having been left
to local option and is inapplicable in some areas, but it has gone far to
eliminate the former objections to a tax title. A study of this act and
the procedures provided therein suggests that it is now a mistake to de-
mand an action to quiet title before regarding a tax title as marketable.
It is the purpose of this Comment to discuss the marketability of a
tax title derived from a sale of land under the provisions of the Real Estate
Tax Sale Act 2 where the contract between the parties has merely specified
that the title be marketable.8 While authority may be found for the state-
ment that a title is not marketable if it involves a hazard of litigation,
for the purposes of this Comment the term marketable title is used as in
Rice v. Shank: 5
"While a vendee entitled to a marketable title can not be compelled
to purchase a threatened lawsuit based upon color of title, alleged
defects which are found to be nonexistant cannot be the means of
escaping contract responsibilities. Where there is no reasonable doubt
either at law or in fact as to good title, an adverse claim asserted in
good faith and with a threat of litigation is not sufficient to invalidate
an agreement requiring a marketable title."
This Comment will attempt to show that as a result of the provisions of
the Real Estate Tax Sales Act there is no reasonable doubt either at
law or in fact as to good title resulting from a tax sale under the act
and that therefore such a title is marketable. The reasons for the hostility
toward a tax deed will be examined in the light of prior law and the effect
of the act on the marketability of a tax title will be explained in this setting.
The history of tax sales in Pennsylvania and the distinction between
seated and unseated lands will be developed as it bears upon an analysis
of the current status of a tax deed. The procedural changes from prior
law will be confined to a historical sketching6 and the methods for assess-
2. PA. STAT. ANN' tit. 72, § 5860.101 (1950).
3. Where the contract of sale calls for a good record title it would appear
that a tax deed would satisfy this condition. But if the contract calls for an
insurable title, and no title company will insure the tax title, the contract would
fail.
4. See, e.g., Appeal of Clouse, 192 Pa. 108, 43 Atl. 413 (1899) ; Holmes v.
Woods, 168 Pa. 530, 32 Atl. 54 (1895) ; Swayne V. Lyons, 67 Pa. 436 (1871).
5. 382 Pa. 396, 115 A.2d 210 (1955).
6. For a detailed comparison of the former procedure with the new procedure
under the Real Estate Tax Sales Act, see McKay, The Old and New Pennsylvania
Tax Sale Procedure, 53 DIcK. L. REv. 177 (1948).
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ment of taxes, origin of the taxing authority and additional means for
collecting taxes other than by a sale of the real estate are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
It is important to note that by its terms the act does not apply to
counties of the first class, cities of the first class, second class, or second
class A (in effect, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Scranton) and school
districts within the above named classes. Every county of the second
through eight classes had the option to refuse to function under this act.7
While several counties declined to function under the act originally, many
now function under the act as allowed by subsequent amendments. No
attempt will be made to discuss the wisdom of leaving the operation of
this act to local option other than to point out the substantial advantages
of the new law over the prior acts.8
I.
THE HISTORY OF TAX SALES IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Since the sale of real estate for non-payment of taxes is strictly a
creature of statute, a brief history of such legislation will help to define
the problem and to clarify the benefits of the act.
The earliest act of the colonial legislature which dealt with real estate
taxation provided for the assessment of taxes upon lands but contained no
provision for a classification of lands as seated or unseated.9 The method
of collection of these taxes was by distraint upon the goods of the owners.
This was continued in the act of 171810 which also provided that the owner
could be imprisoned for non-payment of the taxes. Under the act of 172511
county assessors were directed to exempt from assessments, even though
they had formerly been assessed, all unsettled (i.e., unseated) tracts or
parcels of land. The enforcement of collection continued to be by dis-
traint upon the goods and/or by imprisonment of the owner. This act
appears to contain the earliest statutory reference to unseated lands. In
1755 an act levied provincial taxes for the king's use and expressly pro-
vided that the exemption of unimproved lands from assessment, which
had been granted in the case of county taxes, was inapplicable.' 2 By this
act, for the first time, unimproved lands themselves where authorized
to be sold for unpaid taxes. The act of 1785"3 removed the exemption of
unseated lands from county taxation and empowered the county commis-
sioners to assess and levy a county tax on all unseated tracts of land. This
act was followed by many subsequent acts which qualified the sale of un-
7. PA. STATr. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.102 (Supp. 1958).
8. A note in 11 PA. INTERNAL AFFAIRS 17 (1958) recommends the adoption of
this act by all eligible governing bodies.
9. Act of Nov. 27, 1700, 2 Stat. 34.
10. Act of Feb. 22, 1718, 3 Stat. 175.
11. Act. of Mar. 20, 1725, 4 Stat. 10.
12. Act of Nov. 27, 1755, 5 Stat. 201.
13. Act. of Mar. 25, 1785, 11 Stat. 503.
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seated land and provided some safeguards to its owners. 14 The act of
1815, which is still in force in counties which have not adopted the Real
Estate Tax Sale Act, continued the provisions for the sale of unseated
lands for the non-payment of taxes.15
During the period of these acts there were no provisions for the
sale of seated land since the taxes on seated lands were a personal obliga-
tion of the owners of the land and the land itself was not liable for these
taxes.16 The reason for the distinction between seated and unseated lands
is readily apparent. In the case of seated lands the owner's goods' and
chattels upon the land could be seized and held until satisfaction or sold
in lieu of payment by the owner. But no such procedure was effective
in the case of unseated lands since these were generally owned by absentee
owners who could not be 'personally coerced into payment. The land itself
was the only security for the tax and its sale was the best method of
collection. This divergence of procedure and liability depending upon the
character of the lands resulted in a complicated and involved procedure
for tax sales in Pennsylvania. 17
The first statutory provision for the sale of seated lands for taxes was
passed in 1844.18 This act provided for the sale of seated lands only if it
appeared that personal property could not be found thereon sufficient to
pay the taxes and was further qualified by the requirement that the owner
must neglect or refuse to pay the taxes for two years after a demand had
been made upon him. The current provision for the tax sale of seated lands
in counties not operating under the Real Estate Tax Sale Act is the act
of 193119 which provides for a sale by the county treasurer upon the
completion of the procedure set out in the act.2 0
It is interesting to examine the effectiveness of the provisions for tax
sales under prior law from the view point of purchasers. Although the
acts were designed to encourage purchasers of unseated lands at a tax
sale, the sales themselves were not conducted in such a manner as to be
able to withstand the test of judicial inquiry and a tax title came to be
considered worthless. 2' A purchaser had the intolerable burden of prov-
ing that all the precise requisites of the acts of the assembly were fully
complied with, otherwise the title of the owner was not divested. 22 The
14. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 26, 1789, 13 Stat. 336; Act of Apr. 6, 1790, 13 Stat.
530; Act of Apr. 3, 1792, 14 Stat. 229; Act of Apr. 3, 1804, 4 Smith's L. 201.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5984 (1950). It is interesting to note in the Phila-
delphia area, Philadelphia County cannot adopt the Real Estate Tax Sale Act; Chester
County was one of the original adopters of the act and Montgomery County has
only recently adopted it; Delaware county has not adopted it as of this writing.
16. Stokely v. Bonner, 10 S. & R. 254 (Pa. 1823). See SRGtANT, VISw oF THP
LAND LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 208 (1838).
17. See text accompanying notes 33-40 infra.
18. Act of Apr. 29, 1844, P.L. 486.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5951 (1950).
20. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 5971a-v (1950).
21. See NICHOLSON, TH4 LAW RELATING TO REAL ESTATE IN PENNSYLVANIA
§ 276 (1924).
22. Birch v. Fisher, 13 S.&R. 208 (Pa. 1825).
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act of 181523 attempted to remove these obstacles by providing that the
treasurer's sale and deed would constitute a valid title to the purchaser
where the owner did not redeem his land.2 4 This procedure of treating
a tax deed as presumptively valid continued until it was held that in the
sale of both seated and unseated lands there is a presumption of the regu-
larity of the proceedings. 25 This problem concerning the presumed regu-
larity of a tax deed will be discussed in detail below under the problems
encountered in a Pennsylvania tax deed.
There are some older cases holding that a tax title is a marketable
title in Pennsylvania.2 6 Reeves v. Alter,2 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the mere existence of a tax deed in the vendor's chain of title
does not of itself render the vendor's title unmarketable where no defects
in the proceedings leading up to the issuance of the deed are shown. In
practice, the tendency has been to disregard these older cases because of
the hidden irregularities that are encountered in dealing with a tax deed.2 8
Also, as a result of Reinboth v. The Zerbe Run Improvement Co.,2 9
it can be argued that a tax title to unseated land is marketable due to the
nature of unseated lands. In the Reinboth case the court stated that since
unseated lands are themselves liable for taxes and can be sold in payment
thereof, a new chain of title is started by every such tax sale and a person
relying upon such a sale need not make any proof as to the prior state
of the title. In this case it was held that the tax sale terminated the duty
between tenants in common so that a purchase by one at the tax sale
would not inure to the benefit of the other tenant in common. Thus it
can be seen that in spite of the hostility in practice against insuring tax
titles,80 there is authority that such a title is marketable.
II.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN A PENNSYLVANIA TAX DEED.
There is a general tendency among courts to strike down tax titles
where there has not been strict compliance with the applicable act.3 1 This
attitude is illustrated in Hess v. Westerwick3 2 where the court stated that
the purpose of a tax sale is to collect taxes, not to strip the taxpayer of
his property. Because of this, tax titles are generally not insurable with-
23. See note 15 supra.
24. Turk v. McCoy, 14 S. & R. 349 (Pa. 1826). See text accompanying note 70
infra.
25. See Glass v. Seger, 265 Pa. 391, 109 Atl. 211 (1919) Beacom v. Robinson,
157 Pa. Super. 515, 43 A.2d 640 (1945).
26. Reeves v. Alter, 9 Sadler 412, 12 Atl. 551 (Pa. 1888) Douglass v. Herold,
17 Phila. 2 (C.P. Pa. 1877).
27. 9 Sadler 412, 12 Atd. 551 (Pa. 1888).
28. See text accompanying notes 30-58 infra.
29. 29 Pa. 139 (1858).
30. See note 1 supra.
31, See Drainer v. Slattery, 73 Pa. Super. 361 (1920) ; Hickey v. Chalfant, 20 Fay.
101 (C.P. Pa. 1958).
32. 366 Pa. 90, 76 A. 2d 745 (1950).
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out the aid of the statute of limitations or some other supplementary pro-
ceeding. 3' The resulting distrust of tax titles has subverted the taxing
authorities' powers to enforce the collection of taxes. This has been sub-
stantially eliminated by the new Real Estate Tax Sale Act which provides
that a title derived from a tax sale is a good title.
The dichotomy between the authority to sell seated and unseated
lands has raised additional problems. Unseated lands themselves are liable
for sale in payment of the taxes3 4 while seated lands may be sold only
when sufficient personalty is not found on the property. 35 The actual char-
acter of the land, and not how it appears on the tax list, determines the
applicability of the proper tax sale act.36 A sale of seated land as unseated
when sufficient personal property was upon the land would be void, 37
as would a sale of unseated property as seated.38 While this has been
partially cured by the current acts 39 limiting the grounds for attack on a
tax title to fraud or want of authority to sell,40 it has been held that these
acts do not preclude judicial inquiry into the authority of the county
treasurer to sell the land in question. 41
The actual conduct of the sale has caused the most problems. Where
notice of the sale has not been given to the owner in accordance with the
act and he is without actual knowledge of the sale until after confirmation,
the sale offends due process and is invalid.42 Generally, a landowner is
entitled to be put on notice that his property is being looked to for en-
forcement of claims for unpaid taxes and such notice to be sufficient must
state the landowner's name accurately enough to inform him that he is
the owner of land with regard to which tax proceedings have been insti-
tuted. 43 In Cantwell v. Henzler44 the property was owned by husband
and wife and the notice was sent to the husband alone. The notice itself
was incorrect since it described the property as including a one and one-
half story cottage when the land was in fact vacant. Since this was the
only property the- parties owned in the vicinity, the court held that this
was sufficient notice. Also, where the owner actually knew of the impend-
ing sale prior to the date of sale, a vague description contained in an ad-
vertisement of sale was held sufficient. 45
33. See note 1 supra.
34. See note 15 supra.
35. PA. STAT. ANn. tit. 72, § 5951 (1950).
36. Northumberland County v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 131
.F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1942).
37. Skiner v. McAllister, 3 Sadler 306, 6 Atl. 120 (Pa. 1886).
38. Jackson v. Gunton, 218 Pa. 275, 67 At. 467 (1904) ; Holloway v. Jones, 143
Pa. 564, 22 At. 710 (1891).
39. See notes 15 and 19 supra.
40. Orban v. Oraz, 13 Som. 412 (C.P. Pa. 1948).
41. Muccioli v. Kaminski, 14 Monroe L.R. 59, 81 Pa. D. & C. 561 (C.P. 1953).
42. Hess v. Westerwick, 366 Pa. 90, 76 A.2d 745 (1951) ; Ross Appeal, 366 Pa.
100, 76 A.2d 749 (1950).
43. See Boulton v. Starck, 369 Pa. 45, 85 A.2d 17 (1952). See also Annot. 43
A.L.R.2d 976 (1955).
44. 9 Pa. D. & C. 2d 21 (C.P. Bucks 1956).
45. In Re Tax Sale of Real Estate of Bolen, 393 Pa. 377, 143 A.2d 339 (1958).
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Under the notice provisions for the sale of unseated lands the county
treasurer must give at least sixty days notice of the time and place of the
sale by publishing the notice in a newspaper in the county where the land
is situated. For neglecting to give this notice the treasurer must pay a
penalty of fifty dollars but his failure to give such notice does not invalidate
any sale made in pursuance of the other provisions of this act. 46 While
it would appear that an argument could be made that this provision denies
due process by taking the property of an owner without notice, the con-
stitutionally of this provision has not been challenged, although it has
been in effect since 1815.
The current amendment to the provision for the sale of seated lands
for taxes 47 in counties not adopting the Real Estate Tax Sale Act provides
for advertisement of the intended sale in the county newspaper and notice
by registered mail to the owner of the land ten days prior to the sale and
if he is unknown then notice by registered mail to the terre tenant. If
the notice cannot be served by registered mail, the statute provides for
posting the premises. Failure to give adequate notice renders the tax sale
invalid, 48 but the section provides that if notice is given as required, the
sale cannot be invalidated by proof that the written notice was not re-
ceived by the owner or terre tenant as required. 49
The former procedure required the holder of a tax title to establish
that all the statutory requirements were specifically carried out. This ren-
dered a tax title substantially worthless. 50 Currently the practice is that
the party makes out a prima facie case by producing a tax deed.51 There
is a rebuttable presumption that the property was sold according to law.52
Such a presumption is a procedural expedient especially suited to tax deeds
although it does little to strengthen a tax title, other than to shift the
burden of producing evidence.
An important problem in this area is that tax sales generally do not
divest the lien of a mortgage which has been recorded before the taxes
became a lien. The mortgage must be of the first priority, subject only
to other mortgages and ground rents. 58 Generally taxes become a lien
on the property as of the date when they are assessed against the prop-
erty.54 Under the former and current acts there are provisions for a sale
free of all liens only when an amount sufficient to pay the taxes is not
bid. 55 However, under the statutory provisions dealing with the preserva-
tion of mortgage liens, mortgage liens and ground rents on unseated lands
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 6001 (1950).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5971 (Supp. 1958).
48. Hess v. Westerwick, 366 Pa. 90, 76 A.2d 745 (1950).
49. See note 47 supra.
50. See note 21 supra.
51. See Hughes v. Chaplin, 389 Pa. 93, 132 A.2d 200 (1957) ; Beacom v. Robin-
son, 157 Pa. Super. 515, 43 A.2d 640 (1945).
52. Ibid.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 651 (1930) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5941.3 (1950).
54. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 72, § 5860.303 (1950).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5971q (1950).
[VOL. 4
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss4/3
SUMMER 1959]
are extinguished when the land is sold for non-payment of taxes, whether
or not an amount equal to the taxes is bid.
5 6
When either seated or unseated land is sold for taxes the respective
statutes provide for a redemption period. 57 Because of the redemption
period, the purchaser of a tax title takes only an inchoate title which re-
quires the running of the statutory redemption period to perfect. 58 Thus
the purchaser from one tendering a tax title must determine if a right of
redemption. is outstanding and if it has been properly foreclosed accord-
ing to the statutory requirements. This is eliminated under the Real Estate
Tax Sale Act.
nII.
IMPROVEMENTS UNDER THE REAL ESTATE TAX SALE ACT.
A.
Procedure and Organization.
Under prior law, and in counties not operating under the Real Estate
Tax Sale Act, there existed four kinds of sales for delinquent taxes: city
treasurer's sales in second and third class cities ;59 sheriff's sales for taxes
under the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act ;60 county treasurer's sales
of seated lands under the act of 1931 ;61 and county treasurer's sales of
unseated lands under the act of 1815.62 This procedure has been criticized
as involving too many systems and officers and as placing a heavy burden
on title examination because of the extensive work necessary to check
for tax liens.63
Under the 1947 act there is a single system of filing tax liens at a
single office where all the records are kept. This facilitates a quick and
efficient search for any tax lien on the property. The act creates a tax
bureau in the office of county commissioners with a bonded director in
charge. 64 This is the sole real estate tax sale office in the county which
handles the collection, notification of owners, and eventual sale of the
property.65 This centralization of responsibility and conduct of the sales
by experts will answer the suggestion in Ross Appeal6 6 that those charged
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 651 (1930).
57. Seated lands:-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 6071 (1950); unseated lands:-
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 6001 (1950).
58. Sanner v. Unique Lodge, 349 Pa. 523, 37 A.2d 563 (1944); Shalemiller v.
McCarty, 55 Pa. 186 (1867); Knupp v. Knupp, 57 Dauph. 24 (C.P. Pa. 1946).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10111, 10201, 12198 (1957).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2021 (1957).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12198 (1957).
62. See note 15 supra.
63. See McKay, The Old and New Pennsylvania Tax Sale Procedure, 53 DicK.
L. Riv. 177 (1948).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.202 (1950) (hereinafter cited: Act).
65. Act § 208.
66. 366 Pa. 100, 106, 76 A.2d 749, 752 (1950).
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with the responsibility for tax sales adopt modern business methods in
order to eliminate the number of cases which arise because of poor ad-
ministration of the tax laws.
B.
Distinction Between Seated and Unseated Lands.
It is important to note that the act does not make a distinction be-
tween seated and unseated lands, so that any question as to the proper
classification of the land for sale under one of those categories is elimi-
nated.6" Property under the act is defined as including both seated and
unseated lands.68 Taxes which are lawfully levied on property in the
Commonwealth by any taxing district are a first lien on the property 6
thus making the property liable for the taxes.
C.
Redemption Period.
Under the prior acts70 still in force in counties not adopting the 1947
act, a two year period from the date of the sale was allowed for redemption
of the property sold at a tax sale. However, where the land was purchased
by the county commissioners, it could be redeemed as long as the com-
missioners held title to the property.7 ' The Real Estate Tax Sale Act
of 1947 eliminates this redemption period after a sale by anyone 7 2 although
it allows a redemption before the sale takes place. Once the land is sold
without being redeemed, the purchaser at the tax sale takes a good title
which is not subject to divestiture by a subsequent payment by the former
owner. Any reclaiming by the former owner must be done prior to the
tax sale or it is barred. The act is fair to owners who have failed to pay
their taxes since the procedure from the filing of the tax claim to the sale
which terminates any right of redemption extends over a period of two
years. It is estimated that such a procedure without a redemption period
will encourage purchasers since they can make immediate use of the prop-
erty purchased without fear of loosing it to a redeeming former owner.
D.
Strengthening the Position 'of a Purchaser at a Tax Sale.
The act makes significant strides in strengthening the position of a
purchaser at a tax sale. Taxes are made a first lien upon the land 73 and
67. Act § 102.
68. Ibid.
69. Act § 301.
70. See note 57 supra.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5879 (1950). See Appeals of Roth, 159 Pa. Super.
145, 47 A.2d 716 (1946).
72. Act § 501.
73. Act § 301.
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the land can be sold to foreclose this lien. The lien is divested by a sale
at a price which is sufficient to pay all taxes assessed against the property7 4
although such a sale does not divest the lien of prior mortgages and ground
rents.75 Where a price sufficient to pay the taxes is not bid at the sale,
the tax bureau may petition the court of common pleas of the county for
an order to sell the property free and clear of all claims, liens, mortgages
and ground rents.76 In this respect the act continues former procedure.
The act provides for notice to each delinquent taxpayer of the amount
of the claim due and the liability of the land to be sold in payment of this
claim. 7 It is provided that "a statement in a claim entered that due notice
of the same was given shall be conclusive evidence that notice was given
as required by law." 78 If the claim has not been paid by the next January
following the notice required above, or no exceptions thereto have been
filed, the claim, becomes absolute7 9 and is subject to contest only on the
grounds of payment of the tax involved or of failure to give notice.80
The latter provision must be read as applying when the statement regard-
ing notice is not part of the claim in order to avoid an apparent incon-
sistency. Thus, subject to the above qualifications, the tax is conclusive
and not subject to question after the property has been sold.
The act provides for sale of the property for non-payment of the taxes
thereon8l after notice to the owner.82 Notice must be published in the
newspapers in the county and a registered letter must be mailed to the
owner's last known address. If his address is unknown or the letter is
undelivered the act provides for posting the notice upon the property.
If notice is properly sent, a sale cannot be defeated by proof that the mailed
notice was not received by the owner since the risk of misdirection of the
letter is cast upon the delinquent owner by the act.
The confirmation procedure provided by the act88 gives the purchaser
at a tax sale a good and valid title to the property free from any liens or
encumbrances whatsoever, except mortgage liens recorded prior to the
tax liens and ground rents.8 4 The tax bureau must make a consolidated
return to the court of common pleas of the county not more than sixty
days after the sale setting forth a description of the property, the name
of the owner to whom notice was sent, a copy of the advertisement, the time
of sale, the name of the purchaser and the price for which the property was
74. Act § 304.
75. Act § 609.
76. Act § 610.
77. Act. § 308.
78. Act § 308(d).
79. Act § 311.
80. Act § 314(e).
81. Act §§ 601-15.
82. Act. § 602.
83. Act § 607(a).
84. Act § 607(g). See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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sold."' If it appears to the court that the sale has been regularly conducted
under the provisions of the act, the return and the sales are confirmed.86
If there are no exceptions to the confirmation as provided by the act, the
validity of the tax, its return for non-payment, the entry of the claim,
the making of such claim absolute and the proceedings of the bureau with
respect to such sale are not open to judicial inquiry except as to the giving
of notice as required by the act or the time of holding the sale or of peti-
tioning the court for an order to sell.8 7
IV.
CONCLUSION.
It is submitted that prior practice was incorrect in regarding a tax
title to unseated lands as not marketable since the land itself was liable
for the taxes and failure to give notice did not invalidate the sale. As to
seated lands the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of the sales is per-
haps grounds for requiring supplementary proceedings to fortify the title.
Under the 1947 act a title derived from a tax sale should be considered
marketable until an examination of the record proves otherwise since in
the absence of any defect (other than the so-called defect created by the
mere presence of a tax deed) there is no question of law or fact as to the
validity of the title.88 Prior mortgages which are not divested by the sale
will appear in the chain of title, and if they are not recorded they are di-
vested by the tax sale. The major problem remaining under the act is that
of notice but this has been cured by the confirmation procedure provided
* therein.8 9 The confirmation procedure requires the fact of notice to be
made a part of the court's record and requires the court to pass upon the
regularity of the proceedings before the sale is confirmed. It is submitted
that a confirmation order effects all that a supplementary proceeding to
quiet title could perform without the needless expense and waste of time.
Thus a tax title derived from a tax sale under the provisions of the Real
Estate Tax Sale Act should be considered marketable unless some defect
appears in the record. A decision as to marketability should be made in
each individual case without a blanket condemnation of tax titles as un-
marketable or uninsurable.
Edward I. Carney, Jr.
85. Act § 607(a).
86. Ibid.
87. Act § 607(g).
88. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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TAXATION-CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA-FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL STOCKHOLDER.
The financial provisions of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation
Law dealing with corporate distributions to shareholders were revised
on July 11, 1957, effective September 1, 1958.' Distributions under this
amendment are subject to the varied tax consequences of Subchapter C,
Part I, of the Internal Revenue Code.2 This Comment will show the
stockholder liability for federal income taxes which is created by distribu-
tions of a Pennsylvania corporation and the sources from which such
distributions can be derived. Specifically, distributions of dividends3 and
shares4 of a corporation will be viewed and their tax treatment indicated.
I.
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS.
Initially, it will be helpful to define and, if need be, attempt to align
the relevant terms of the Code and the B.C.L.
Relation of dividends under the Code and B.C.L. The Code defines
dividends as a distribution of property made by a corporation out of earn-
ings and profits of the current year or those earnings and profits accumu-
lated after February 28, 1913. 5 The B.C.L. similarly uses the word divi-
dend to describe distributions in cash or property (other than shares of
the corporation) to holders of its outstanding shares, excluding treasury
shares, which are normally payable by resolution of the board out of earned
surplus.6
Relation of earnings and profits under the Code to earned surplus
under the B.C.L. Corporate dividends to stockholders receive ordinary
income treatment under the Code when they are money, securities and
any other property7 excluding stock dividends and stock rights,8 if they
are made out of earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913
or out of earnings and profits of the current tax year. The term earnings
and profits is not specifically defined by the Code 9 but the final regulations
of the Treasury Department in relation to the Code contain a number of
rules to assist in their computation.'" Under the 1933 B.C.L.," as well
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-701 to § 709 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, compiling the 1958 Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, hereinafter cited as
B.C.L.
2. INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, §§ 301-18.
3. B.C.L. § 2852-702.
4. B.C.L. § 2852-702.1.
5. INT. REV. CODE oP 1954, § 316.
6. B.C.L. § 2852-702 A(1).
7. INT. Rxv. CoDE op 1954, § 61.
8. INT. RSv. CoDE oP 1954, § 317(a).
9. 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 9.28 (1956). But see, 2 CCH 1959
STAND. FED. TAX REP. qr 2300.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1 (1955).
11. B.C.L. § 2852-701 to 704.
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as the 1957 amendment, dividends are payable primarily out of earned
surplus. 12 The only exception is cumulative preferred stock dividends,
which can be paid out of capital surplus.18 Earned surplus is not defined
by the B.C.L., but rather a method of determining earned surplus is given.
1
"
Since the 1958 amendment did not change this method of computing earned
surplus, a reference to a leading Pennsylvania case, 15 defining earned sur-
plus as "actual earnings and profits", shows that the terms "earnings and
profits" under the Code and "earned surplus" under the B.C.L. are similar.
However, Code earnings and profits is a more inclusive term, viz., even
though a corporation has no earned surplus, it may have current earnings
or capital surplus and stated capital which represent earnings and profits,' 6
and a distribution from these can be treated as a dividend.' 7
Capital surplus under the B.C.L. Capital surplus is defined in the
B.C.L. as "capital contributed for or assigned to shares in excess of the
stated capital applicable thereto (whether as a result of original issue of
shares at amounts in excess of their par or stated value, reduction in par
or stated value after -issuance, transactions by the corporation in its own
shares or otherwise), capital received other than for shares, whether
from -shareholders or others, and amounts of surplus arising from re-
valuation of, or unrealized appreciation in, assets." 18
Stated Capital under the B.C.L. Stated capital means, at any par-
ticular time, "the sum of the par value of all shares then issued having a
par value, the consideration received by a business corporation for all
shares then issued without par value, except such part thereof as may
have been allocated otherwise than to stated capital in a manner permitted
by this act, and such other amounts as may have been transferred to the
stated capital account of the corporation, whether from the issue of shares
or otherwise minus such formal reductions from such sum as may have
been effected in a manner permitted by this act." 19
12. B.C.L. § 2852-702.
13. B.C.L. § 2852-702 B.
14. "Earned Surplus means the entire surplus of a corporation other than its
capital surplus and includes surplus acquired by merger or consolidation available for the
payment of cash dividends on common shares under section 907 of this act." B.C.L.
§ 2852-2.
15. Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 624, 52 A.2d 571, 574
(1947).
16. Under the B.C.L. the board of directors can transfer earned surplus repre-
senting earnings and profits to capital surplus, § 2852-704 A, or to stated capital,
§ 2852-702.1 A(1).
17. INT. REv. CODV OF 1954, § 316(a). However even when a distribution is
out of earnings and profits it might not be a dividend. For example, if the corpora-
tion redeems stock and complies with Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302(b), the distribu-
tion will be treated as a part or full payment in exchange for the stock. For other
examples see Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1(c) (1955).
18. B.C.L. § 2852-2.
19. B.C.L. § 2852-2.
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A fictitious corporation will be used to assist in the description of
some corporate distributions. Its authorized stock is 2,000 common shares
of $100 par value; 1,000 shares of no par; and 1,000 shares of $100 par
value preferred. There are 1,000 common shares of $100 par value stock
outstanding which are held by five individuals. 20 As of January 1, 1959,
the corporation had the following basic balance sheet which will be changed
to meet the exigencies of specific distribution examples..
COLLINS AUTO CORPORATION
Assets .... $500,000 Liabilities ........... $200,000
Stated Capital ....... 100,000
Capital Surplus ...... 50,000
Earned Surplus ...... 150,000
$500,000 $500,000
In any example, unless otherwise stated, it will be assumed that the
corporation is complying with the B.C.L. requirements for a legitimate
dividend or stock distribution, 2 1 and that there are earnings and profits
at least equal to the stated earned surplus. 22
II.
DIVIDEND IN CASH.
A.
When the Earned Surplus Is Adequate.
Basically dividends may be declared and paid in cash or property
only out of unreserved 23 and unrestricted 24 earned surplus.2 5 If the Collins
Auto Corporation has an earned surplus of $150,000 and declares an
20. It will be assumed that these shareholders have not elected to change the
tax status of the corporation as permitted by §§ 1371-77 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The general effect of this election is that income earned by the
corporation is not taxed as income of the corporation, rather it is taxed directly
as income to the shareholders in the same manner as partnership income would
be taxed.
21. Cash and property dividends are not to be distributed when the corpora-
tion is insolvent, or when payment thereof would make the corporation insolvent.
The B.C.L. also provides that dividends cannot be paid in contravention of corporate
articles or when the preferential amount payable to preferred stockholders on voluntary
liquidation will be infringed. B.C.L. § 2852-702.
22. In none of the examples will any earned surplus be restricted or reserved
thereby making it unavailable for dividends under B.C.L. § 2852-702 A (1).
23. B.C.L. § 2852-704 E allows the board of directors by resolution to create
reserves out of earned surplus for any proper purpose.
24. B.C.L. § 2852-701 F(3) requires earned surplus used to purchase treasury
stock to be restricted as long as the corporation retains the treasury stock.
25. B.C.L. § 2852-702 A(l).
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$80,000 cash dividend the stockholders must pay ordinary income tax
to the full extent of the dividend when received, 26 because there are ade-
quate earnings and profits out of which the dividend can be paid.
B.
When the Earned Surplus is Inadequate.
Suppose the earned surplus of Collins Auto Corporation is $40,000
and a $50,000 distribution is made to the holders of the common stock.
The $10,000 distributed in excess of the $40,000 earned surplus violates
the B.C.L.,27 but the excess might still be a distribution of earnings and
profits under the Code. For example, the board of directors might have
transferred earned surplus to capital surplus.2 8 This accounting device
will not benefit the stockholder however, 29 and he must pay ordinary income
tax to the extent that funds represented by capital surplus are presumed
to be earnings and profits.30
To the extent that the distribution of the Collins Auto Corporation
was not out of earnings and profits,3' the cash received is not taxed as a
dividend, but the basis of the stock is reduced and any amount in excess
of the basis is treated as a capital gain.3 2
For example, suppose the corporation had no accumulated earnings
and profits, but by mid-year it had $10,000 of actual earnings. At that
time a balance sheet is drawn up showing the $10,000 as earned surplus
and the $10,000 is then distributed. By the end of the year however, with-
out taking into account this distribution, it has a deficit in current earnings.
The $10,000 is not a dividend because the Collins Auto Corporation had
no earnings and profits at the end of the tax year.3 3
However, if the corporation in contravention of the B.C.L.,3 4 dis-
tributes $10,000 in mid-year when it has no accumulated or current earn-
ings and profits but later in the year it earns $10,000, then the distribu-
tion is a taxable dividend.3 5
26. The dividend is taxable income in the year of distribution and not at the
date of declaration unless at the date of declaration the stockholder has an unquali-
fied right to demand payment. Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210 (1934) ; Treas.
Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957).
27. B.C.L. § 2852-702 A(1).
28. B.C.L. § 2852-704 (A).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6 (a) (1955).
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316 (a) ; 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 9.27 (1956).
31. In order to find that there are no earnings and profits it must be shown that
there are no earnings and profits of the current year and that those accumulated
since February 28, 1913 have been exhausted. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2 (a) (1955).
32. INT. REv. CODE O 1954, § 301 (c) (2), (3).
33. INT. Rtv. CODE OF 1954, § 316 (a)(2).
34. B.C.L. § 2852-702 A(1).
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316 (a) (2). Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1 (a) (1) (1955),
states that the original $10,000 distribution is taxed as a dividend and that no re-
duction of earnings and profits is allowed. Therefore the $10,000 earnings and
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III.
DIVIDEND IN KIND.
Under the B.C.L. dividends in kind can be made legitimately only
when the earned surplus is at least equal to the book value of the property
distributed. 6
Generally, for tax purposes, the Code does not require the corpora-
tion to recognize a gain or loss when property that has appreciated or de-
preciated in value is distributed. 1 Regardless of whether any gain or loss
is to be recognized by the corporation, the individual stockholder will pay
ordinary income tax on the fair market value of the distributed property,38
with the exception that this tax will not be imposed on that part of the
distribution which exceeds the earnings and profits of the corporation. 9
In this latter situation the fair market value of the property received in
excess of earnings and profits will reduce the basis of the stock of the
shareholder and any excess received over the basis of the stock will be
treated as a capital gain.40 In addition, an adjustment of earnings and
profits must be made when the corporation distributes inventory assets
which have appreciated in value.
41
A.
Dividend in Non-Inventory Property.
Suppose Collins Auto Corporation, with an earned surplus of $150,000,
distributes General Motors stock with an adjusted basis 42 of $50,000, and
a fair market value of $100,000. Let us assume that the corporation, as
permitted by the B.C.L., has taken into consideration the appreciation in
value of the General Motors stock, by increasing capital surplus $50,000.43
Here the fair market value of the stock, $100,000, is taxed as ordinary
income because the corporation has earnings and profits of $150,000 which
are sufficient to cover the distribution. The earnings and profits and the
profits is accumulated in the following year. If in a subsequent year cash represented
by these accumulated earnings and profits is distributed it will again be taxed as a
dividend. It would seem fairer to allow the earnings and profits to be considered
without reduction in the year of the original distribution, but to eliminate them from
accumulated earnings and profits in the following year to prevent the double taxation
of the same earnings and profits as dividends. In other words, "accumulated earn-
ings and profits represent a running account, which is based upon the algebraic sum
of the yearly profit and loss results from the commencement of the corporate life,
reduced by distributions chargeable to earnings and profits." SURREY & WARREN,
FEDERAL INcOMg TAXATION, at 1049 (1955).
36. B.C.L. § 2852-702.
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 311.
38. INT. RgV. CODE OF 1954, § 301 (a).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1 (a) (2), (3) (1955). Distributions made before June
22, 1954, received the same treatment. INT. REv. CODE Or 1939, § 115 (n), added by
70 STAT. 404 (1956).
40. See note 32 supra.
41. INT. RV. CODE oF 1954, § 312 (b).
42. See INT. REV. CODE Ol 1954, §§ 1011-22.
43. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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earned surplus of the Collins Auto Corporation are reduced by the ad-
justed basis of the property distributed 44 ($150,000 minus $50,000 equals
$100,000). The capital surplus should also be reduced by $50,000 to re-
flect the distribution of revalued assets which are no longer corporate
property. The B.C.L. allows the board of directors by resolution to reduce
the capital surplus engendered by revaluation of assets. 45 It further permits
any realization of the increase in value of property to be transferred from
capital surplus to earned surplus. 4
6
As distinguished from the former situation, suppose the earnings
and profits are $50,000 and the General Motors stock has a $40,000 ad-
justed basis and a $60,000 fair market value. In this situation $50,000
of the fair market value is a dividend and the remaining $10,000 is a re-
duction of basis because the distribution can be considered a dividend
only to the extent of the $50,000 earnings and profits.47 The earnings and
profits of the Collins Auto Corporation are reduced by the adjusted basis
of the property distributed ($50,000 minus $40,000 equals $10,000 earn-
ings and profits). The result under the B.C.L. should be the same whether
or not the corporation increased the capital surplus to take into considera-
tion the stock's appreciation in value.4 8 No claim can be made that prop-
erty with a value in excess of the $50,000 earned surplus has been dis-
tributed because the B.C.L. does not require that the $60,000 fair market
value of property be used to determine the amount of earned surplus to
cover the dividend. 49 On the contrary, in order to have the balance sheet
balance, earned surplus can only be reduced by the book value of the
asset distributed. If the earned surplus was reduced by the fair market
value of the property distributed, it would be understated because the
earned surplus should not reflect the appreciation in value unless there
is a realization which, as explained previously, does not occur when there
is a property dividend.
B.
Dividend in Inventory Property.
Before inventory assets5" are distributed the Code requires the earn-
ings and profits of the corporation to be increased to reflect their app reci-
44. INT. Rev. CODE OP 1954, § 312 (a) (3).
45. B.C.L. § 2852-704 B.
46. B.C.L. § 2852-704 B. Although the B.C.L. does not define realization, a
reasonable interpretation of the term as used in the B.C.L. would'not include a prop-
erty dividend, even though the stockholder must pay dividend tax to the extent
that the fair market value of the property distributed is covered by earnings and
profits. Realization of the appreciated value would only arise on a sale of the prop-
erty at an excess over cost and a return of the money to the corporate treasury. In
other words, since the corporation receives nothing when it gives a dividend in
property it cannot be said to have realized an increase in the value of the property.
47. See note 39 supra.
48. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
49. The B.C.L. does not say how a property dividend is to be valued.
50. INT. RJzv. CODF OP 1954, § 312 (b) (2) (A) defines inventory assets as "(i)
stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind which would properly
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ated value.51 If the Collins Auto Corporation, with an earned surplus of
$150,000, has cars which are part of inventory, and they have an adjusted
basis of $50,000 and a fair market value of $60,000, the $10,000 appreciation
has to be included in earnings and profits before the cars are distributed.
The stockholders must pay tax on the $60,000 fair market value of the
assets because there are sufficient earnings and profits.
5 2
Again, suppose the trucks have an adjusted basis of $50,000 and a
fair market value of $60,000 but that earnings and profits are $50,000. If
this were non-inventory property the stockholders would only pay ordinary
income tax on $50,000 of the $60,000 distributed, i.e., to the extent of
earnings and profits. However, since earnings and profits must be in-
creased to reflect the appreciation in value of inventory property to be
distributed, 53 the taxpayer must include the $60,000 fair market value
as a dividend. The earned surplus cannot be increased by the $10,000
appreciation recognized by the Code because this is not a B.C.L. realization
of gain.5 4 However the earned surplus on the corporate books will only
be reduced by the $50,000 adjusted basis of the cars and not by their
fair market value hence the net result is the same and the distribution
cannot be said to be in excess of earned surplus.55
IV.
CASH DIVIDEND TO CUMULATIVE PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS.
Assume Collins Auto Corporation has preferred shareholders whose
stock has an accrued cumulative dividend right. If the corporation has
no earned surplus it may pay this cumulative dividend in cash only, out
of capital surplus, providing a majority of all the stockholders approve it
and the corporation is not insolvent or thereby rendered insolvent. 8 Pay-
ment of a cumulative dividend out of capital surplus57 does not necessarily
mean that it is not a distribution of earnings and profits. The cash re-
ceived will be treated as a taxable dividend to the extent that the dis-
tribution is made up of earnings and profits which had been transferred
to capital surplus5 8 or stated capital.59
be included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable
year; (ii) property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of its trade or business; and (iii) unrealized receivables or fees,
except receivables from sales or exchanges of assets other than assets described in
this subparagraph."
51. INT. IV. CODI OV 1954, § 312 (b) (1) (A).
52. See note 39 supra.
53. See note 51 supra.
54. See note 46 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
56. B.C.L. § 2852-702 B.
57. According to the B.C.L., even restricted capital surplus, i.e., capital surplus
already charged with the cost of non-redeemable shares, can be used to cover this
type dividend. B.C.L. § 2852-702 B.
58. See note 28 supra.
59. B.C.L. § 2852-702.1 A(1). When a no par stock dividend is given the board
has an option on whether to transfer surplus to stated capital. B.C.L. § 2852-702
A(2).
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Distributions out of capital surplus when there are no earnings and
profits will reduce the basis of the stock and any excess received over basis
istreated as a capital gain.60 A nice situation arises when there are no
earnings and profits and the corporate capital surplus consists solely of
the appreciation in value of inventory assets.61 The cash dividend based
on this surplus does not create earnings and profits and is not a taxable
dividend because the inventory assets themselves have to be distributed
before the appreciation in value will create earnings and profits.62 Assume
for subsequent tax purposes that the corporation, in contravention of the
B.C.L.,63 later distributes these inventory assets to common stockholders
when it has no earnings and profits. Earnings and profits will be created
to the extent the fair market value exceeds the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty at the time of distribution and this difference is a taxable dividend
to the common stockholders.6 4
In summary, the appreciated value of the inventory assets can create
capital surplus to be used to make a distribution to preferred stockholders
which will not be taxable as a dividend but will be considered a valid
dividend under the B.C.L. Conversely, if there are no earnings and profits
and, in contravention of the B.C.L., these appreciated inventory assets
are distributed to common stockholders they will create earnings and profits
causing part of the distribution to be treated as a dividend.
V.
STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS.
There is no immediate tax effect on a stock dividend unless it is a
distribution in lieu of money.65 However there are varying tax conse-
quences, depending on the nature of the original distribution, when this
stock is subsequently sold or redeemed. Stock distributions are authorized
by the B.C.L.66
A.
Distributions of Par Stock.
Suppose Collins Auto Corporation, with earned surplus of $100,000,
desires to distribute a stock dividend of one share of $100 par common
stock for each share of $100 par common stock outstanding. To do so
the B.C.L. requires $100,000 in any type surplus to be transferred to stated
60. See note 32 supra.
61. B.C.L. § 2852-704 B.
62. INT. Rev. CoDt oP 1954, § 312 (b) (1).
63. B.C.L. § 2852-702 A(1).
64. See note 62 supra.
65. When it is in lieu of money it is taxable immediately as an ordinary
dividend. INT. RXv. CODX oF 1954, § 305 (b).
66. B.C.L. § 2852-702.1.
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capital.6 7 However, this bookkeeping transfer does not cause the trans-
ferred surplus to lose its tax identity as earnings and profits if that is
what it was originally. For example, if all the earned surplus was used
to cover the stock dividend, a subsequent cash distribution of $100,000
out of capital surplus, created by the revaluation of assets to cumulative
preferred stockholders would be a taxable dividend because the corporation
had earned surplus in the stated capital account.68
When the stockholder receives this stock dividend which is not in
lieu of money,69 he must allocate the adjusted basis of his old stock be-
tween his old and new stock. 70 Any excess over the allocated basis re-
ceived on a later sale or redemption is treated as a capital gain if the
original distribution was not in lieu of money and was (1) common stock
to common stockholders, whether or not there were earnings and profits
at the time of the distribution, or (2) any other stock distribution when
there were no earnings and profits at the time of the distribution.71 There-
fore, in the present example when the stockholder sells or redeems his
common stock dividend the amount received will be taxed as would the
amount received on the sale of a capital asset.
B.
Distribution of "Section 306 Stock."
Assume the stock distributed was (1) not in lieu of money, (2) in
other than common stock and (3) made when the corporation had earn-
ings and profits. This is a "section 306 stock" dividend.72 No tax is im-
posed when the stock is distributed, but taxation does result when the
"section 306 stock" is disposed of.73
With the exception of a preferred stock distribution to preferred
stockholders, the B.C.L. only allows a "section 306 stock" distribution if the
articles so provide or such distribution is authorized by the affirmative
vote or written consent of the holders of a majority of outstanding shares
of the class in which the distribution is to be made.74
On the sale or disposition other than redemption of "section 306
stock"7 5 the amount realized will receive ordinary income treatment up
to the shareholder's pro rata share of earnings and profits at the time
of the stock distribution.76 Any amount realized in excess of the pro rata
67. See note 59 supra.
68. INT. Rzv. CODt oP 1954, § 316.
69. See note 65 supra.
70. INT. REv. CODt OF 1954, § 307.
71. INT. REv. CoME ol 1954, § 306.
72. INT. Rev. CODS oP 1954, § 306.
73. INT. Rgv. COD or 1954, § 306 (a)(1), (2); (b)(1), (2), (4).
74. B.C.L. § 2852-702.1 A(4).
75. If the stockholder terminates his whole stock interest in the corporation
then § 306(a) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 does not apply and the transaction
receives capital asset treatment. INT. REv. CODS or 1954, § 306(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.306-2(a) (1) (1955).
. 76. INT. REV. CODS or 1954, § 306(a) (1) (A) (i), (ii).
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share is treated as a capital gain to the extent it exceeds the adjusted
basis of the stock.
7 7
On redemption by the corporation of "section 306 stock" the dis-
tribution is taxed as a dividend"8 to the extent that there are earnings
and profits at the time of redemption.7 9 Any amount realized above the
stockholder's share of earnings and profits reduces the basis of the stock
and any further excess is treated as a capital gain. s0
The corporation, to benefit the stockholders taxwise, should not dis-
tribute "section 306 stock" when it has a large amount of earnings and
profits unless it intends to redeem the stock at some later date when there
are limited earnings and profits and adequate surplus to satisfy the B.C.L.
requirements for redemptions. Conversely, if the corporation has limited
earnings and profits it is better to make a "section 306 stock" dividend
and not redeem it because the stockholder will have a better opportunity
to make a capital gain on a later sale of the stock.
VI.
CONCLUSION.
This Comment has been directed primarily at the tax consequences
of certain corporate distributions to stockholders of a Pennsylvania cor-
poration, thereby making it necessary to interpret relevant provisions of
the B.C.L. Certain of its clauses are vague and different meanings are
probably inevitable. For instance, the B.C.L. does not clearly state when
a realization of the increase in value of assets takes place or how to value
property distributions. It would seem that common sense and good faith
are the only standards that can be used by directors when they decide
for B.C.L. purposes how to treat a distribution when it is affected by
these problems.
Directors should also remember that earnings and profits under the
Code is a broader concept than is B.C.L. earned surplus. Even though a
dividend may not be out of earned surplus it may constitute earnings
and profits resulting in ordinary income taxation to the recipient stock-
holder. Lastly, the board should be conscious of the extremely varied tax
consequences on redemption or sale or other disposition of a "section 306
stock" distribution.
Joseph P. Kelly
77. INT. Rzv. COD OF 1954, § 306(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
78. The redemption will not be considered a dividend if it comes within one
of the several exceptions of § 306(b) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
79. INT. REv. CODX OF 1954, § 306(a) (2).
80. INT. Riv. CODS oF 1954, § 301(C) (2), (3).
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TAXATION-PAYMENT OF HEALTH INSURANCE PROCEEDS AS A
PENSION FOR DISABILITY RETIREMENT.
If a company wishes to give a salary increase to an employee who is
in a high income tax bracket, it would be most beneficial to him tax-wise
to defer payment of this additional amount until after he has retired.
Generally, upon retirement the tax bracket of the executive will be much
lower because his regular salary payments will be discontinued. Thus,
where an unmarried executive is earning a salary of $35,000 per year
and he receives an increase of $10,000 per year, he would realize after
taxes only about $3,000 of the increase. But if he were to receive the
same $10,000 per year after his retirement, he would realize more than
$7,000 after taxes.
There are various methods within the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
whereby the imposition of the tax upon an employee may be postponed.
However, most of these methods have inherent disadvantages to the em-
ployer and/or the employee, especially if the latter is a high salaried
executive. Where pension payments are paid to a former officer or em-
ployee there will be distinct tax advantages, even though he is the only
one benefited, if the payments can be considered as proceeds from "health
insurance" as that term is used in the Code. The goal is, in effect, to have
payments made as a pension for disability retirement.
This Comment will discuss the usual methods used to make pension
payments to an employee and will compare these methods with the use
of health insurance as a means of paying a pension to an executive or other
limited classes of employees.
I.
TAXATION OF QUALIFIED PENSION PLANS.
Under Section 402 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts
actually distributed to a beneficiary under a qualified plan are taxable to
him in the year that they are distributed.' Subject to certain limitations,
employer contributions to stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, or annuity
plans are deductible in the year when made. 2 Under the usual pension
plan the employee receives a pension for his life, the amount of which
is determined by reference to the contributions to the trust, length of serv-
ice and prior earnings. If the pension plan qualifies under Section 401 of
the Code the employee is not taxed on amounts contributed by the em-
ployer in the year when made, even when the amount is not forfeitable
upon termination of the employment before retirement.3 The employee is,
however, generally taxed currently on any contributions he may make
to the pension plan.
1. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 402(a).
2. INT. lPv. CODE or 1954, § 404.
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1 (1956).
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Upon retirement, when the pension payments are received in periodic
installments, each payment is fully taxed if the employee made no contri-
butions. 4 If the employee has contributed, then under the annuity pro-
vision section 72(b) the amount equal to the employee's contributions
to the plan divided by his life expectancy is considered exempt in every
year in which he receives benefits. But if the payments received by the
employee within the first three years would equal his total contributions
to the pension plan, then the amounts received as an annuity would be
excluded from his gross income until the amount contributed to the plan
by the employee is reached and thereafter all amounts received would be
included in his gross income.5 If the entire amount of the pension is re-
ceived within one year after retirement, that amount less the employee's
contributions is taxed as a long term capital gain. 6
Pension payments pursuant to a qualified plan have the effect of
postponing the tax on income received by the employee until he has re-
tired, at which time he usually has no regular source of income. This
means that the pension payments will be taxed at a lower rate than they
would have been if the employer's contributions to the plan were taxable
to the employee when made.
When the company wishes to convert a salary increase for a high
salaried executive into pension payments under a qualified plan, there is
one great disadvantage. For a plan to qualify under section 401(a) there
must be no discrimination in favor of employees who are officers, share-
holders, persons who are in a supervisory capacity, or highly compensated
employees.7 Also the benefits to top employees are proportionately limited
by the benefits given to other employees under the plan.8 To receive the
favorable tax treatment afforded to qualified pension plans, the plan must
benefit all classes of employees. Thus if there is at present no company
plan, in order to include an executive under such a plan, all other employees
must be included under it, often at a prohibitive cost to the company.
II.
NON-QUALIFIED PLANS AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS.
Contributions made by the employer to a pension plan that does not
qualify under section 401 are not deductible in the year when made unless
the employee's rights under the plan are nonforfeitable, as for example,
where he could leave the company before retirement age and still be en-
4. INT. REv. CODE Olt 1954, § 72(a).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72(d) (1).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (2).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3 (1956) (states that a plan cannot discriminate in favor
of the supervisory or executive personnel as to elegibility requirements, contributions,
or benefits conferred). See Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BuL,. 128 for a quali-
fications guide under Section 401 of the Code for pension, profit sharing and stock
bonus plans.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (1956).
9. INT. REV. CODA Olt 1954, § 404(a) (5).
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titled to the pension. However, if the employee's rights are nonforfeitable,
under section 402(b) the employee is taxed on the employer's contribu-
tions to the pension plan in the year when made. This may cause great
hardship on the executive who is the recipient under a non-qualified
pension plan since he will be taxed at the higher rate just as though he
had received an increase in salary, and also he will not receive the extra
funds with which to pay the increased tax. If the employee's rights in the
plan are forfeitable, the contributions of the employer to the plan are not
deductible under section 404(a) (5), in the year when made nor when
payments are made to the employee.' 0 Thus there are great tax disad-
vantages to a non-qualified pension plan either to the employer if the em-
ployee's rights are forfeitable or to the high salaried employee if his rights
are nonforfeitable.
If the company and the executive were to agree that the latter shall
be paid a stated sum each year for life commencing upon his retirement
at age 65, what are the tax consequences of such a deferred compensation
agreement? Such an agreement is not under any specific statutory section
so it need not conform to any statutory requirements, as must a qualified
pension plan. The employer probably would wish to fund such an agree-
ment so that there will be Proceeds available when the executive reaches
the retirement age. Perhaps the most common method of funding the
agreement is by the use of an endowment policy. If the employer pays
the premiums and otherwise has all of the incidents of ownership of the
policy, the premiums will not result in tax to the employee" even though
he is also the sole shareholder. The employer receives no deduction for
the premiums but may deduct the payments made to the employee, when
the latter actually receives the payments and is taxed on them.12 As long
as the employee does not have any interest in the trust, either forfeitable
or non-forfeitable, the tax consequences of a non-qualified pension plan
are not imposed on the employee. 13 When the policy proceeds are paid
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12(1956). The deduction is available where the
employer makes direct payments to the employee after retirement rather than funding
the plan.
11. Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957). A deferred compen-
sation agreement was entered into between the president-sole shareholder and the
corporation, funded with a life insurance policy on the president's life. The premiums
were not taxable to the president in the year when paid by the corporation. The
corporation had the right to assign the policy, change the beneficiary, receive
dividends and borrow on the policy. See also Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th
Cir. 1958).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1956). Since the employer has no obligation
to fund his contractual agreement with the employee, the latter has no rights in
the fund because the insurance policies comprising it are wholly owned by the em-
ployer. Thus he is entitled to a deduction upon actual payment to the employee,
since he is using his own unrestricted funds. This is different from a nonqualified
plan where the employer agrees to set aside amounts for the employees' benefit.
13. Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957); Crispin v. United
States, 200 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1952) (employee's rights in the annuity were con-
ditioned on his continuing employment) ; Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230
(3d Cir. 1951). But see United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950).
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to the retired executive, they will be taxable to him under the rule for
annuity payments. 14
There are, however, two major tax dangers to the executive under
deferred compensation agreements. The first is that the executive might
be taxed on the contributions (or premium payments) made by the em-
ployer in the year when made, on the theory that income has been con-
structively received by the employee even though payment has been deferred
until retirement. The second problem is whether the present value of the
future pension is taxable as compensation at the time of the contract be-
cause of the economic benefit received then.
The doctrine of constructive receipt has been used only where the
right to receive the income has accrued; thus, agreements entered into
before the income is earned will avoid the application of the doctrine.' 5
Most deferred compensation agreements provide that the employee (1)
remain with the company for a certain length of time, usually until the
retirement date, or (2) hold himself available for consultations, or (3)
refrain from competition after retirement. These conditions make the
employee's rights to the compensation contingent and thus the doctrine
of constructive receipt would not be applicable.
Under the economic benefit test the fair market value of a promise
to pay a sum in the future is difficult to ascertain, especially when made
by an employer who is a self-insurer. Where the employer purchases non-
forfeitable annuities from commercial insurance companies for the benefit
of employees, the present value of the annuity is taxed to the employee in the
year when purchased. 16 However, where a self-insuring employer promises
to pay a life annuity to the employees in the future, such agreement has
no fair market value, for taxation purposes.'7  Thus, where the employer
promises to pay the compensation in the future to the executive, out of
his own funds as opposed to a commercial insurance or endowment policy,
there seems to be no present economic benefit to the employee since the
promise is contingent upon the continued prosperity of the employer. Of
course, this will vary in different cases. Probably more than a mere
naked promise to pay is necessary in order for the present value of the
promise to pay compensation upon the retirement of the executive to be
included in the executive's gross income in the year when made.' 8
14. See Lefevre, Deferred Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX
1081, 1096 (1957) ; see notes 4, 5, 6, supra.
15. See Glenn v. Penn, 250 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Fleming v. Commissioner,
241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v.-Oates, 207 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
16. United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Ward v. Com-
missioner, 159 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947).
17. Estate of Kann v. Commissioner, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1947).
18. See Lefevre, Deferred Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. OF FeD. TAX
1081, 1085 (1957) for a discussion of the constructive receipt and economic benefit
tests. The House version of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provided that under
an arrangement deferring payment of compensation, payments so received should
be taxable upon receipt. H.R. Re. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1954). The
Senate eliminated this provision.
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Amounts received under deferred compensation agreements or pension
plans are eligible for the retirement income credit against the employee's
income tax.19 Where the taxpayer has reached the age of sixty-five, income
from pensions, annuities, interest, rents and dividends are eligible for the
credit but the credit is limited to 20% of retirement income up to $1,200
per year.2 0 Also earned income in excess of $900 reduces the retirement
income eligible for the credit against the tax of the employee if he is under
65.21 In the case of a retired executive under 65 and earning an annual
salary as a consultant, the amount of retirement income available for the
credit would be limited to a maximum of $900 per year, but where the
sum was received for holding himself available for consultation, the full
retirement income credit would be allowed where he actually did not render
any service.2 2 Thus the retired executive under most pension or deferred
compensation plans would be entitled to a credit based upon $1,200 of
the amounts received thereunder as retirement income. However, in most
cases this credit is not enough to make any material difference in the
tax paid by executive.
III.
HEALTH INSURANCE.
Section 22(b) (5) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code provided that
amounts received through accident or health insurance as compensation
for personal injuries or sickness were excludable from the gross income
of the recipient except to the extent that such amounts were attributable
to medical expense deductions.2 3 The United States Supreme Court, in
Haynes v. United States,2 4 held that health insurance is an undertaking
by one person for reasons satisfactory to him to indemnify another for
losses caused by illness and that there was no reason why the term "health
insurance" should be limited to the particular forms of insurance con-
ventionally made available by commercial companies. This decision re-
solved the conflict as to whether sick-leave payments based on regular
wages and coming directly from the employer were includable in gross
income and resolved it in favor of the taxpayer. 25 The Haynes case also
19. INT. Rtv. CODE oF 1954, § 37(c).
20. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, §§ 37(a)(d).
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 37(d)(2). If the taxpayer is between the ages
of 65 and 70, the figure is $1,200 instead of $900; if he is 72 or over, this type of
limitation is not applicable.
22. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.37-4, 5 (1956).
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(b) (5), 53 Stat. 10.
24. 353 U.S. 81 (1957) (Under the employer's health plan, every employee with
two years service with the company was to receive "sickness disability benefits" when
he missed work because of illness. The amount and duration of payments were
set out at length and varied with the length of service.)
25. Cf. Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952) ; I.T. 4107, 1952-2
Cum. BULL. 73. See also Moholy v. United States, 235 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1956) (sick
leave pay for firemen under municipal civil service rule for two weeks in case of
illness annually is not an amount received through health insurance).
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reversed the Treasury Services' position giving preference to plans financed
by employee contributions. 28
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 proceeds received through
health insurance are treated differently. If the insurance was purchased
solely through the contributions of the employee, then under section
104 (a) (3) of the Code, amounts received through health insurance are
excluded from the gross income of the recipient. Where the proceeds
received through accident or health insurance are attributable to contri-
butions by the employer which were not taxable to the employee when
made, such proceeds are included in gross income.27 However, section 105
of the Code excludes from gross income all health insurance proceeds
which represent reimbursements for medical expenses of the employee,
permanent injury payments and wage continuation plans.28 Under the
provision for wage continuation plans, amounts received thereunder are
excluded from gross income up to one hundred dollars a week. Under
section 105(e), amounts received under accident or health plans for em-
ployees are to be treated as amounts received through accident or health
insurance and thus may come under the one hundred dollar a week ex-
clusion for wage continuation plans.
Since in the 1954 Code there are provisions for health insurance
under sections 104(a)(3) and 105(a) and also for health plans under
section 105(e), it has been suggested that the former might refer to
health insurance policies issued by commercial companies and the latter
to cases where an employer is a self insurer.2 9 This seems to be a reason-
able interpretation, especially in light of the conflict that arose under the
1939 Code as to whether "health insurance" was limited to proceeds re-
ceived under commercial insurance policies. This distinction, however, is
academic because the same treatment is afforded health insurance and
health plans under the 1954 Code.
Under the Treasury Regulations, an accident or health plan may
cover one or more employees and there may be different plans for different
employees or classes of employees. Also, an accident or health plan may
be insured or non-insured, and it is not necessary that the plan be in
writing or that the employees' rights under it be enforceable.30 Thus, a
health and accident plan could be set up to benefit only the high-salaried
executives of the company. In Kuhn v. United States,8 1 the taxpayer,
who was retiring from his position as a vice-president of the company,
entered into an agreement whereby he was to be paid an annual salary
of $25,000 for his services as a consultant, but in the event of inability to
perform such services for physical reasons attested to by competent medical
26. I.T. 4107, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 73.
27. NT. R.v. CODE of 1954 §§ 104(a) (3), 105(a).
28. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954 §§ 105(b),(c),(d).
29. See COMM4NT, 64 YALE L.J. 222, 230 (1954).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5 (1956).
31. 258 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1958).
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evidence, he was to receive $15,000 annually. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reversing the district court, held that
payments under the last part of this agreement were proceeds received
from health insurance and excludable from gross income under the 1939
Code. This was so even though the taxpayer was sixty-six years of age
at the time of making the contract and had previously suffered a heart
attack. The court quoted from the regulations issued under the 1954 Code
defining a health plan3 2 and strongly intimated that the agreement in this
case would be treated as a wage continuation health plan with the $100
a week exemption under the 1954 Code. 3 The Internal Revenue Service
has ruled that when an employer purchases an individual insurance policy
providing for disability benefits for a key employee, amounts received
thereunder by the employee are proceeds from accident or health insurance
within sections 104(a) (3) and 105(a) of the 1954 Code. 4 Thus, under
the 1954 Code a health insurance or a health plan may cover one or
more employees and it may be insured by a commercial company or by
the employer himself.
In order to qualify for the one hundred dollar a week deduction, the
payments to the employee must be made pursuant to a "wage continuation
plan" which is defined as a plan where wages or payment in lieu of wages
are paid to an employee for a period during which he is absent from work
on account of personal injury or sickness.35 Payments to an executive, who
is semi-retired and is in the capacity of a consultant when he becomes dis-
abled, as the Kuhn case, would seem to meet this test. The test is more
clearly met when the executive is still fully active in his position when he
becomes incapacitated.
The requirement that the executive prove his inability to perform
his duties is one of the difficulties in making pension payments by means
of health insurance. The disability must incapacitate the employee and
prevent him from substantially carrying out his duties or else the amounts
distributed will not be treated as proceeds from health insurance.3 8 But
practically speaking, a disability to perform substantially his duties should
not be too difficult to find, especially where the executive is at an advanced
age or has a serious health impairment such as a heart condition.37 Another
difficulty that arises in the area of health insurance is that under the
Treasury Regulations, disability payments may not be paid beyond "re-
tirement age" or else they will not be considered as payments under wage
continuation plans.3 8 The Internal Revenue Service has defined retirement
32. See note 30 supra.
33. 258 F.2d 840, 843 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1958).
34. Rev. Rul. 58-90, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 89.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4(a)(2)(i) (1956).
36. Hall v. United States, 242 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
821 (1958).
37. See Kuhn v. United States, 258 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1958); Jackson v. Com-
missioner, 28 T.C. 36 (1957).
38. Treas. Reg. 1.105-4(a) (3) (i).
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age as (1) the lowest age specified in the written employees' pension or
annuity plan at which the employee would have the right to retire without.
the employer's consent and receive retirement benefits computed at the
full rate set forth in the plan or (2) in the absence of a written pension
or annuity plan, the age at which it has been the employer's practice to
terminate the services of that class of employees to which the particular
employee belongs, because of age, and provided such age is reasonable
and (3) if (1) and (2) are not applicable then generally age 65.9 If the
retirement age is substantially higher for one class than it is for others,
the facts will be carefully examined to determine whether it is a bona fide
retirement age. 40 Usually the retirement age for executives who are still
active in the management of the company is much higher than for other
employees, and in the case of an executive who is on a consultant basis,
such as in the Kuhn case where the taxpayer was sixty-six is almost
unlimited.
If a health plan could qualify for the favorable tax treatment afforded
under the 1954 Code, it would have some very distinct advantages over
other pension agreements. Health insurance plans may cover only high
salaried employees and need not be extended to all employees as is required
for qualified pension plans. Also, contributions made by the employer
to health plans are not taxable to the employee in the year when made
under Section 106 of the Code, and the employer may deduct these pay-
ments as a business expense. Thus, the tax disadvantages arising under
non-qualified pension plans are avoided, namely the employer's payments
being taxed to the employee in the year when made when the employee's
rights are non-forfeitable, and the employer not being able to deduct his
payments to the plan when the employee's rights are forfeitable. Deferred
compensation agreements at the present time have a relatively uncertain
tax status because they are not covered by any specific sections of the
Code whereas health insurance plans have statutory approval. Also, under
deferred compensation agreements the full amount of the annual payments
are taxable to the retired employee with a possible retirement income credit,
while payments under health insurance under the wage continuation sec-
tion of the Code receive a $5,200 exemption.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
Under facts similar to those in the Kuhn case, it would seem possible
and desirable, from a tax viewpoint, to use a health insurance plan to make
pension payments to an executive. The court in the Kuhn case correctly
applied the law as it exists today. But there are serious shortcomings
39. Rev. Rul. 57-76, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 66.
40. Ibid.
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in this area of the Code. Why should a man who is disabled at an ad-
vanced age receive the benefits of a section of the Code designed gen-
erally to benefit a man who is temporarily forced to be idle for reasons of
health but who expects in the normal course of events to return to work?
The executive who is at an advanced age could not be considered as tem-
porarily disabled but on the contrary is disabled permanently because of
his age. When is a man disabled and when is he worn out?
In the area of pension plans, Congress extended favorable tax treat-
ment to plans which benefited all class of employees and not merely the
executive class. To allow proceeds received by an aged executive to be
exempt from taxation up to $5,200 a year would frustrate this intent
because it would tend to be discriminatory in favor of the executive class
and at the same time would receive more favorable tax treatment than
qualified pension plans.
Congress could add a provision to the Code which would prevent the
health insurance sections from being applied to cases where the disabled
person, because of advanced age, has no prospects of ever returning to
his job. In the absence of congressional action the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice must examine each case closely to perceive if payments made under
the guise of health insurance are really retirement income.
Edward H. Feege
TORTS-LIABILITY OF TAVERNKEEPER UNDER CIVIL LIABILITY ACTS
FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE INTOXICATION OF A
PATRON-QUESTION OF CAUSATION.
It is well recognized that the abuse of intoxicating liquors' can have
disasterous consequences. Not only does the overindulger suffer as a
result of his incapacity, but many times the innocent members of his
family and even innocent strangers suffer from his actions as well.
Concerning the person who willfully allows himself to become under
the influence of alcohol, the law has long held him to be both criminally
culpable2 and civilly liable3 for the consequences of his willful act in
putting himself in such a condition. Regardless of the liability that the
1. The term "intoxicating liquor" will vary from state to state as to what
liquors, beverages and other liquids are included. States have included the definition
of this term in their liquor control acts. See, e.g., ILL. Rev. STAT. c.43, § 95 (1955).
2. See Slough, Some Legal By-Products of Intoxication, 3 KAN. L. Riv. 181(1955).
3. See McCoid, Intoxication and Its Effect Upon Civil Liability, 42 IowA L. R~v.
38 (1956).
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law places on the overindulger, this is of little benefit to the innocent
injured members of his family, and also to strangers when the over-
indulger is found to be insolvent or judgment proof. Therefore, the inno-
cent persons have turned for recovery to the tavernkeepers who served
the overindulger, and have met with varying degrees of success. Of course,
there should be some causation established between the tavernkeeper
serving the person and the ultimate injury. The purpose of this Comment
is to discuss the degree of causation which must be established before the
injured parties can recover from the tavernkeeper.
In our efforts to determine what degrees of causation are necessary
for recovery, and from whom, it might be well to hypothesize various
possibilities of recovery that may result from a person becoming intoxi-
cated. Suppose X, a young airplane designer at E Aircraft Co., has a
wife W and two children C, and C2 and also provides support for his
brother's widow F who lives with them. One day X drops by G's tavern
for several drinks and also makes similar stops at H's tavern and J's
tavern. Subsequently, while X is driving home, his car collides with a
car driven by M and both X and M are killed. M is married to wife W2
and has one child C8 . Tests show that X was intoxicated. However, it
cannot be shown at exactly what tavern X became intoxicated. It can
be appreciated that the first consideration in the determination whether
any or all of the tavernkeepers can be held liable and to whom, is whether
the claiming parties have an interest which the law protects. Therefore,
some treatment must be given to this subject of interests as is done below.
However, once the injured party's interests are established, the chief con-
sideration is whether any or all of the tavernkeepers caused the intoxica-
tion of X, and whether the intoxication can be held to have caused to a
sufficient degree the injuries for which recovery is sought.
I.
CAUSATION AT COMMON LAW.
The common law has steadfastly maintained that a party-plaintiff is
not entitled to relief against a tavernkeeper who sold intoxicating liquor
to a patron who became intoxicated and who then injured the plaintiff or
whose intoxication caused the injury.4 In such cases, courts have held
that the drinking of the liquor is the proximate cause and not the furnish-
ing of it.5 Similar reasoning has been followed as to injuries suffered by
4. See Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943) ; Henry
Grady Hotel Co. v. Surgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943); Howlett v.
Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949) ; Christoff v. Gradsky, 140 N.E.2d 586(Ohio App. 1956) ; Demge v. Feirstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936).
5. See, e.g., Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D.C. Alaska 1950);
Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Beck v. Gore, 245
Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
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the intoxicated person himself.6 The fact that the sale was in violation
of a statute, other than one expressly providing for recovery in this situ-
ation, has been held to be of no aid to the party-plaintiff.T
II.
CAUSATION UNDER THE CIVIL LIABILITY ACTS.
In the second half of the nineteenth century the legislatures of many
states began to enact Dram Shop Acts or Civil Liability Acts.8 Although
the general purpose of these acts is described in terms of protecting the
public welfare by encouraging temperance in the consumption of alcoholic
liquors, the more specific purpose appears to be to cope with the evils
resulting from the liquor traffic by compensating for the resulting injuries.
The justification for placing the burden on the tavernkeeper to compensate
for such injuries is that this is a risk incident to his engaging in the sale
of alcoholic liquor.' 0 In light of the above purposes, the provisions of
these acts have been found to be constitutional when tested." Moreover,
although it has been argued, and some courts have held, that these acts
are penal,' 2 it is now generally agreed that they are remedial,' 8 and being
such, they are entitled to liberal interpretations. 14
The Civil Liability Acts or Dram Shop Acts of the various states
may be generally classified into two types as to the scope of interest pro-
tected and the remedies provided therein. The first type provides for
recovery from the vendor by practically any person in his own name for
6. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955) ; Norman v. Gallick,
19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Hoyt v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477, 128 Atl.
688 (1925). However, recovery has been permitted where there was a wanton
disregard of the welfare of the intoxicated person so that it had become almost an
intentional wrong which would negate any contributory negligence. Nally v. Blan-
ford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d 675
(1934) ; McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, (1883).
7. This is true even where there was a state statute which made the serving
of intoxicants to an intoxicated person a misdemeanor. See Hitson v. Dwyer, 61
Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943) ; Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774
(1939), 1941 Wis. L. Rxv. 419. Contra Schelin v. Golberg, 146 A.2d 648 (Pa. 1958).
8. See list of citations of the state statutes of fourteen jurisdictions which had
civil liability acts as of 1888 in Osborn, Liquor Statutes in United States, 2 HARv. L.
Rev. 125, 134n. (1888).
9. See Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 I1. App. 579, 79 N.E.2d 854
(1948); Hyba v. Horneman, 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939).
10. See Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Hill v.
Alexander, 321 Ill. App. 627, 53 N.E. 307 (1944); Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa
172, 111 N.W. 422 (1907).
11. See Pierce v. Albanese, 114 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Huckaba
v. Cox, 14 Ill. 2d 126, 150 N.E.2d 832 (1958) ; Garrity v. Eiger, 272 I11. 127, 111
N.E. 735 (1916), aff'd, 246 U.S. 97 (1918).
12. See Beck v. Gore, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
13. See Pierce v. Albanese, 114 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957) ; Howlett v.
Doglio, 402 I1. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1942) ; Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535,
81 N.W.2d 110 (1957). It appears that the remedial provisions in the Illinois statute
are broader than those in the other states.
14. In fact, the statutes of -some states specifically provide that the liquor
control provisions of their statutes are to be liberally interpreted. See, e.g., ILL. Riv.
STAT. c. 43, § 94 (1955) ; GvN. LAWS ov R.I. § 3-1-5 (1956).
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injuries to his interests by the intoxicated patron or resulting from the
intoxication of the patron.15 The second type limits the recovery from
the vendor to only the intoxicated patron's immediate family."6
Since these acts have been summarily reviewed and the persons whose
interests are protected have been enumerated, the specific question of the
elements of causation necessary for recovery may now be treated. This
will necessitate a discussion of the two different aspects of causation under
most of these acts, viz., (1) causation of the intoxication of the intoxicated
person, and (2) causation of the injuries allegedly attributed to the
intoxication.
A.
Causation of the Intoxication.
The Civil Liability Acts or Dram Shop Acts of many states speci-
fically condition recovery upon the defendant's having caused the intoxica-
tion of the person who caused the injury or whose intoxication resulted
in the injury complained of. 17 However, the first problem encountered in
establishing this causation is just what is "intoxication" under these acts
and when can one be found to be in this condition. An early Pennsylvania
court,' 8 in an action under that state's act, defined intoxication in the
following manner:
"Whenever a man is under the influence of liquor so as not to be
entirely ... himself, he is intoxicated: although he can walk straight;
although he may attend to his business, and may not give any outward
and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk. Yet if
he is under the influence of liquor so as not to be . . . himself, so as
to be excited from it, and not to possess that clearness of intellect and
that control of himself that he otherwise would have, he is intoxicated."
15. Generally, the plaintiff may be anyone injured in person, property or means
of support by the intoxicated person or in consequence of his intoxication. See note
43, infra. See also ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 121 (1940); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
c. 50, § 7 (1935) ; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 43, § 135 (1957); IOWA CoDE § 129.2 (1946);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 61, § 95 (1954); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 436.22 (1948);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1957); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 16; N.D. REv.
CODE § 5-0121 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT.. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (1954) ; GEN. LAWS OF R.I.
§ 3-1-5 (1956); VT. STAT. § 6214 (1947).
16. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (1953) (only the spouse, child or em-
ployer of the intoxicated person can sue): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1953)
(only the parent, guardian or employer of unmarried minor can sue) ; ORE. REV.
STAT. § 30.730 (1957) (only the spouse, parent or employer can sue); Wyo. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. § 53-224 (1945) (only the parent, guardian, spouse, dependent or person
liable for the support of the intoxicated minor or habitual drunkard can sue).
17. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 121 (1940) ; COLO. REV. STAT. c. 50, § 7 (1935)
ILL. Rev. STAT. c. 43, § 135 (1957); IOWA CODE § 129.2 (1946); Mt. REV. STAT.
ANN. c. 61, § 95 (1954) ; MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 436.22 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (1957) ; N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 16; N.D. REV. CODE § 5-0121 (1943);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (1954) ; GEN. LAWS or R.I. § 3-1-5 (1956) ; VT.
STAT. § 6214 (1947).
18. Elkin v. Buschner, 16 Atl. 102, 104 (Pa. 1888).
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Several courts have cited this definition with favor 9 and it would there-
fore appear that intoxication under the statutes is not meant to be any
different than in the common law tort situation.20 It is recognized that
the drinking of intoxicants has different effects on different individuals.2 1
Hence, it should be a question of fact whether this condition has been
reached by the patron in question. 22
Once it is decided that the person causing the injury was intoxicated
it must then be decided, as a question of fact, whether the serving of the
patron by the defendant was a cause of the patron's intoxication.23 A diffi-
cult situation arises where there is an indirect furnishing of intoxicating
liquor by the defendant tavernkeeper to the patron who becomes intoxi-
cated. It would appear that the tavernkeeper would be liable where he
sold the liquor to X and X in turn gave the liquor to Y, who was also on the
premises, and who became intoxicated and injuries resulted therefrom.24
Also, an indirect sale might occur where X bought liquor from the de-
fendant tavernkeeper and then took the liquor outside the defendant's prem-
ises and gave it to Z who became intoxicated. In this latter situation, it
must be shown that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that
Z in fact would consume some of the liquor.2 5 However, once it is so
shown, then the defendant is liable and the fact that it was consumed without
the defendant's premises becomes immaterial.2 6
An even more difficult situation arises when the person has become
intoxicated as a result of being a patron at G's bar, H's bar and J's bar,
all having contributed to the intoxication of the person. The acts of sev-
eral states expressly provide for liability for mere contribution to the
intoxication of the intoxicated person, 27 and courts have held that the
19. See, e.g., Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 45 N.E.2d 625 (1942); Cook v.
Kirgan, 332 Ill. App. 294, 75 N.E.2d 120 (1947).
20. See McCoid, Intoxication and Its Effect Upon Civil Responsibility, 42 IowA
L. Rev. 38 (1956). See also Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 431, 57
N.W.2d 254, 258 (1953), for a further definition of "intoxication" under these acts.
21. See Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 11. 295, 45 N.E.2d 625 (1942).
22. See Shorb v. Weber, 188 Ill. 126, 58 N.E. 949 (1900) ; Skillman v. McDowell,
317 Ill. App. 85, 45 NE.2d 574 (1942). In the Shorb case it was held that in
charging the jury it was not even necessary to define "intoxication."
23. Cox v. Hrasky, 318 Ill. App. 287, 47 N.E.2d 728 (1943). In establishing
this causation, at least one state, Oklahoma, provides the injured party with an
inference of causation, if the party can establish that the intoxicated person was
intoxicated at the time of the act causing the injury and that the defendant tavern-
keeper had served the intoxicated person during that day. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.37, § 121 (1954). A court has held that the intoxication of the person at the
scene of an automobile accident was admissible as establishing that the person was
intoxicated at the time he was served. Pierce v. Albanese, 114 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d
606 (1957).
24. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Bennet v. Audi-
torium Bldg. Corp., 299 Ill. App. 139, 19 N.E.2d 626 (1939).
25. Bell v. Poindexter, 336 Ill. App. 541, 84 N.E.2d 646 (1949).
26. Pilkins v. Hans, 87 Neb. 7, 126 N.W. 864 (1910).
27. See COLO. Rev. STAT. ANN. c. 50, § 7 (1935) ; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 43, § 135(1957); Me. Rev. STAT. ANN. c. 61, § 95 (1954); MICH. ComP. LAWS § 436.22(1948) ; N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTs LAW § 16; GEN. LAWS OF R.I. § 3-1-5 (1956) ; VT. STAT.§ 6214 (1947).
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tavernkeepers G, H, and J are jointly and severally liable.28  It is only
reasonable that a defendant, as a joint contributor, must have contributed
to an appreciable degree before he should be held liable. Yet, the courts
have not been so clear in laying down the degree required and in fact it
would appear that almost any degree would be sufficient. One court2 9
has held that the contribution by the defendant tavernkeeper of merely
three glasses of beer out of at least fifteen glasses that caused the intoxi-
cation would be sufficient to make the defendant liable. If a patron stops
at G's bar and has one drink and then proceeds to H's bar and drinks
himself into a state of intoxication, could G be held to be severally liable
for all injuries resulting from the intoxication without offending due
process?
Since courts have not treated the constitutionality of the statutes in
this particular situation, the treatment by the courts of the question of
constitutionality with regard to other questions of causation arising under
these acts may be looked to in order to predict what treatment this par-
ticular situation would receive. Generally, the right of the states, acting
under their police power, to regulate the liquor traffic has been allowed
to be exercised quite broadly.30 In the case of Pierce v. Albanese,3' the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut upheld the constitutionality of
the Connecticut act 3 2 notwithstanding that it did not require any causa-
tion between the selling of intoxicating liquor to the patron and the intoxi-
cation which resulted in the injury complained of. The United States Su-
preme Court dismissed an appeal of this case for want of a substantial
federal question. 3 The grounds on which the decision of constitutionality
was reached by the state court was that the statute, which makes tavern-
keepers liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated person who was served
while intoxicated, was a reasonable means for promoting another provi-
sion of the Connecticut Liquor Control Act which made it a criminal
offense to serve an intoxicated person. 4 However, under the contributory
28. Earp v. Lilly, 217 Ill. 582, 75 N.W. 552 (1905); Kearney v. Fitzgerald, 43
Iowa 580 (1876); Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa 486 (1874).
29. McConnell v. Bogaert, 208 Ill. App. 582 (1917). In this case the court
held that even if it were necessary that the contribution had to be "appreciable,"
which it doubted, three glasses of beer would meet this requirement. In Hall v.
Ditto, 128 Ill. App. 187 (1906) the court held that the contribution does not have
to be "appreciable." See also the situation where the defendant tavernkeeper
contributes to the habit of becoming intoxicated. Danley v. Hibbard, 222 Ill. 88
(1906) ; Bunyan v. Loftus, 90 Iowa 123 (1894). In the latter case it was held
that it was not necessary to define "contributed."
30. See Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S.
304 (1917); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
31. 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606, 611 (1957). The court stated: "Because of
the danger to the public health and welfare inherent in the liquor traffic, the police power
to regulate and control it runs broad and deep, much more so than the power to
curb and direct ordinary business activity."
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (Rev. 1958).
33. 355 U.S. 15 (1957).
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1958) provides for a fine of up to one thousand
dollars and/or a year in jail for serving an intoxicated person.
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causation theory, a tavernkeeper could have served the patron and be
charged with contributory causation of the intoxication and still not have
served him while intoxicated. Of course, it could be argued that the pur-
pose of these enactments is to cope with the evils of the liquor traffic by
compensating the resulting injuries.3 5 However, there is the question of
whether an arbitrary rather than a reasonable means of control has been
imposed. It is difficult to see how the test of reasonableness could be
met since the tavernkeeper is made an insurer without fault. Therefore
it would appear that some substantial or appreciable degree of causation
of the intoxication should be required to be shown before the contributing
tavernkeeper should be held liable.
At least ten of the states having Civil Liability Acts require that not
only must the sale of the liquor by the defendant tavernkeeper have caused
the intoxication but also the sale must have been unlawful.36 Unlawful
sales would include sales to minors, intoxicated persons and habitual
drunkards.3 7 Upon testing of this particular point of the necessity of both
requisites the Supreme Court of Michigan,38 in reversing the lower court,
held that a tavernkeeper could not be liable if the sale was not unlawful
notwithstanding that it was contributory to the intoxication of the patron
who caused the injury.
Before leaving this discussion of the question of the causation of the
intoxication, it is interesting to note that in two of the states, Connecticut 9
and Oregon, 40 no liability arises under the statutes unless the patron is
intoxicated at the time of serving. Hence there is no liability placed upon
the one or more tavernkeepers who contributed to the intoxication of the
person. However, any tavernkeeper who merely sells the patron even one
drink subsequent to that time is liable for all of the resulting injuries.
B.
Causation of the Injuries.
Upon examination of the question of causation between the intoxica-
tion and the injuries complained of, it can be found that the earlier courts
35. See cases cited note 9 supra.
36. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 121 (1940); IowA CODE § 129.2 (1946); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. c. 61 § 95 (1954); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 436.22 (1948); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1957); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 16; N.D. REv. CODE§ 5-0121 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (1954); GEN. LAWS OF R.I. § 3-1-5
(1956); VT. STAT. § 6214 (1947).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL § 65.
38. Juckniess v. Doran, 323 Mich. 566, 36 N.W.2d 148 (1949) (plaintiff had
failed to establish that the alleged unlawful sale was to an intoxicated person and
there were sales by other tavernkeepers subsequent to that of the defendant's sale).
39. CONN. G N. STAT. § 30-102 (Rev. 1958). In Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241,
129 A.2d 606 (1957), the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that this
act is remedial rather than penal. This is true notwithstanding that possibly a
defendant tavernkeeper could be held liable for selling the liquor although the
patron never even drank any of the intoxicating liquor.
40. ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.730 (1957).
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were uncertain as to the type or degree of causation necessary under the
statutes for various types of injuries.41 Later, the courts formally recog-
nized a distinction in classification of causes and laid down definite rules
which distinguished between injuries which were caused by the direct
affirmative acts of the intoxicated person and those injuries which were
merely consequential to the intoxication.42
1. Injuries Caused by Direct Affirmative Acts.
The Civil Liability Acts of the various states which provide for re-
covery for injuries which are caused by the affirmative acts of the intoxi-
cated person make such provision with the words "by any intoxicated
person", 43 with reference to the resulting injuries. It is seen that prac-
tically all the statutes provide for recovery in this situation. These affir-
mative acts causing injury may be direct blows or assaults44 by the intoxi-
cated person upon the injured plaintiff or may be impacts upon the plain-
tiff's person due to the reckless driving of the intoxicated person. 45 Also
the affirmative act may be directed to the intoxicated person himself, there-
by causing loss to the plaintiff's means of support. The affirmative acts
toward the intoxicated person himself may be his shooting himself,40
impacts on himself due to his reckless driving 4 7 or even the act of drink-
ing itself causing the death of the intoxicated person due to the injurious
qualities of intoxicants.4 8  One of the usual yet more notable points of
these statutes is that the party-plaintiff does not have to show that the
intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury which resulted from the
affirmative act of the intoxicated person.4 9 However, it is reasonable that
41. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Buckman, 46 Iowa 195 (1877) where the court did not
distinguish between injuries caused by the affirmative act of the intoxicated person
and consequential injuries. However, from some of the earlier decisions, the
suggestion can be found that different classifications must be recognized. See
Kennedy v. Wittaker, 81 Ill. App. 605 (1898) ; Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172,
111 N.W. 422 (1907).
42. See Haw v. 1933 Grill Inc., 297 Ill. App. 37, 17 N.E.2d 71 (1938) ; Currier
v. McKee, 99 Me. 364, 59 Atl. 442 (1907).
43. "Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who shall
be injured in person or property or means of support by any intoxicated person,
or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall
have a right of action in his own name against any person who shall, by selling
or giving to another contrary to the provisions of this title any intoxicating liquors,
cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well
as exemplary damages." IOWA CODE § 129.2 (1946). See also ALA. CODE ANN. tit.
7, § 121 (1940); COLO. Rev. STAT. ANN. c. 50, § 7 (1935); DEL. COWg ANN. tit. 4,
§ 716 (1953) ; ILL. Rnv. STAT. c. 43 § 135 (1957) ; Mg. Rev. STAT. ANN. c. 61, § 95
(1954); MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 436.22 (1948) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1957);
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 16; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1953); N.D. Rtv.
CODE § 5-0121 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (1954) ; GEN. LAWS or R.I.
§ 3-11-1 (1956) ; VT. STAT. § 6214 (1947).
44. Heikkala v. Isaacson, 178 Mich. 176, 144 N.W. 508 (1913) (recovery was
permitted even though the plaintiff who received the blows was also intoxicated).
45. Morton v. Roth, 189 Mich. 198, 155 N.W. 459 (1915).
46. Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 111 N.W. 422 (1907).
47. Bejnarowicz v. Bakos, 332 Ill. App. 151, 74 N.E.2d 614 (1947).
48. Sworski v. Coleman, 208 Minn. 43, 293 N.W. 297 (1940).
49. See Cox v. Hrasky, 318 Ill. App. 287, 47 N.E.2d 728 (1943) ; Heikkala v.
Isaacson, 178 Mich. 176, 144 N.W. 508 (1913) ; Sworski v. Coleman, 208 Minn. 43,
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some degree of causation should be required to exist between the intoxica-
tion and the resulting injury before liability is incurred by the tavern-
keeper, even if it be quite remote. The defendant tavernkeeper should
not be liable merely because the resulting injury is coincidental with the
intoxication. 50  In addition, there is also the situation where the patron
had the fully formed intent to commit the assault or act causing injury on
another prior to his commencing the drinking which resulted in his in-
toxication. It is submitted that in this situation it would certainly not
be reasonable to hold the tavernkeeper liable merely because the patron
became intoxicated before committing his previously conceived and pre-
viously intended wrong.
Concerning this classification of injuries caused by the affirmative
acts of the intoxicated person, it has been held by an Illinois court 5' that
the act of the intoxicated person must be tortious before the injured party
should be allowed recovery. However, as mentioned previously these
statutes created a cause of action which is independent of any common law
action. While some elements of a common law cause of action do appear
under these statutes, 5 2 there is a question whether this holding of the
Illinois court expresses any majority opinion as to the general application
of the statutes. That court went to the extreme of requiring the plaintiff
to meet all the requirements of a common law action in negligence before
he could recover against the defendant tavernkeeper, and even went so
far as to permit the defense of contributory negligence to defeat the plain-
tiff, which is unusual.53 If the court in using the word tortious was merely
speaking of the wrongful quality of the act of the intoxicated patron it
would appear to be correct, but if it meant that the act would have to
be a tort, making the intoxicated person concurrently liable before re-
covery could be had against the defendant tavernkeeper, it would appear
to be against the weight of authority. As stated above, the question of
proximate cause between the intoxication and the injury complained of
is not required in these actions based on an affirmative act of the intoxi-
cated person. Furthermore, such a ruling would be against the very
scope of liability created by these statutes as stated in the case of Bistline v.
293 N.W. 297 (1940). In the case of Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 111
N.W. 422 (1907), the court pointed out that the statute declares the act done
by the intoxicated person is presumed to be the result of his intoxication.
50. See Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 111 N.W. 422 (1907).
51. Hill v. Alexander, 321 I1. App. 400, 53 N.E.2d 307 (1944). In this case
the intoxicated person allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff by the affirmative
act of crushing the plaintiff's finger in a door which the intoxicated person fell
against.
52. See notes 63 and 64 infra as to how the common law elements of proximate
cause appear in the consequential causes of action under the statute.
53. While the plaintiff's direct contribution to the intoxication can bar recovery,
contributory negligence is no defense in an action under the Civil Liability Acts.
Lester v. Bugini, 316 Ill. App. 19, 44 N.E.2d 68 (1942) ; Beem v. Chestnut, 22 N.E.
303 (1889); Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 8 Hun. 16 (N.Y. 1873). The fact that plaintiff
was himself intoxicated does not bar recovery but merely goes to the credence to
be given his testimony. Heikkala v. Isaacson, 178 Mich. 176, 144 N.W. 508 (1913).
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Ney Bros.,54 viz., that the purpose of the statute is to extend liability to
include injuries which would be too remote under any common law action.
In fact, these acts do more than merely make the defendant tavernkeeper
vicariously liable for the torts of the intoxicated patron since the tavern-
keeper could be held liable even when the intoxicated person would not
be liable under the common-law rules of tort.5
2. Injuires Consequential fromt the Intoxication.
The statutes of the various states which permit recovery for injuries
of the second general classification, viz., consequential injuries resulting
from the intoxication of the patron, use such phrases as injuries "in con-
sequence of" 56 the intoxication, "by reason of" 57 the intoxication, "by the
intoxication," 58 and "all damages resulfing in whole or in part" 59 from
the intoxication. As distinguished from the situations where the injuries
were caused by the direct affirmative act of the intoxicated person in which
proximate cause is not an issue, in these actions of consequental injuries
it must be shown that the intoxication of the patron was the proximate
cause of the injury complained of before the defendant tavernkeeper can
be held liable.8 0 However, some courts have used language to the effect
that the intoxication may be merely a contributory proximate cause and
not the sole cause.8 ' Of course, one of the chief considerations is what
is the meaning of the element of proximate cause when applied under
the Civil Liability Acts. At least one court 2 has attempted to differentiate
between the particular element of proximate cause under the statutes
and as it is applied in a common-law negligence action. However, since
other courts have used such phrases as "natural and probable consequences"
and "foreseeability" 63 in describing proximate cause under the acts, one is
led to believe that it is synonymous with the term as used under the
common-law cause of action. This belief is further supported by the ab-
sence of any distinction being made between common-law actions and
actions under the acts in most of the cases and still further by the fact
that the courts use negligence cases to support their treatment of proxi-
54. 134 Iowa 172, 111 N.W. 422 (1907).
55. See Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957).
56. ALA. CODe ANN. tit. 7, § 121 (1940); COLO. Rv. STAT. c. 50, § 7 (1935);
CONN. GFN. STAT. § 30-102 (Rev. 1958) ; ILL. RAv. STAT. c. 43, § 135 (1957) ; IOWA
CODX § 129.2 (1946); N.D. Rev. Cooa § 5-0121 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37,
§ 121 (1954) ; VT. STAT. § 6214 (1947).
57. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1957).
58. Mz. Rtv. STAT.. ANN. c. 61, § 95 (1954); N.Y. Civir, RIGHTs LAW § 16.
59. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.730 (1957).
60. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957) ; Currier v. McKee,
99 Me. 364, 59 Atl. 442 (1904).
61. See Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Schwehr v.
Badalamenti, 14 Ill. App. 2d 128, 143 N.E.2d 558 (1957).
62. Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535, 81 N.W.2d 110 (1957); see 42
MINN. L. REv. 145 (1957).
63. Danhoe v. Osborne, 11 Ill. 2d 77, 142 N.E.2d 20 (1957).
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mate cause under the statutes.6 4 It is true that at times the courts have
been very liberal in finding causation in an action based on injuries
occurring in consequence of intoxication. 5 However, it would appear that
they were still clinging to the rules of common-law negligence actions
when dealing with questions of proximate cause.
If the courts are going to apply common-law concepts of proximate
cause in actions under the statutes, there is involved such elements of
common-law tort law as the difference between "cause" and "condition" 66
and the related topic of intervening cause. Analogous to the common law
of torts, it would have to be determined whether the intervening act or
force was independent of the intoxication and was such as to break the
causal connection between the alleged intoxication and the injury or
whether the intervening act or force would not have been brought into
motion except by reason of the intoxication. If the latter be the situation
then the defendant tavernkeeper would be liable notwithstanding the in-
tervening act or force. 67 Based on the reported cases, it would appear
that one of the more frequent situations in which the question of inter-
vening cause arises is where the patron has become intoxicated and is
then injured by the assault of a third person. Perhaps, it might be well
to analyze the cases involving this situation as an insight into how the
question of intervening cause is treated under these Acts.
In observing the cases wherein such a situation was involved and
attempting to reconcile them, it would appear that the courts consider
various factors, viz., (1) whether the intervening act of the third party
was wrongful; (2) whether the third party acted on the provocation of
the intoxicated patron and whether the acts of the intoxicated patron
causing the provocation were due to his intoxication; and (3) whether
the injuries resulting from the assault were the natural and probable
consequence of the assault.
Concerning the first factor, the court in the case of Currier v. McKee68
held that recovery should be had against the defendant tavernkeeper be-
cause the third party was merely acting in self defense when attacked
by the plaintiff's husband and hence the act of striking the plaintiff's
husband was not wrongful. Conversely, in the case of Schugart v. Egan69
recovery was denied against the tavernkeeper where plaintiff's husband
was stabbed by a third party when the husband merely insulted him.
Hence the wrongfulness lay in the use of excessive force. Concerning the
64. See also Moran, Actions Under Illinois Dram Shop-Theories of Liability,
1958 U. ILL. L.F. 191 (1958), in which the author suggests that there is no difference
between proximate cause in the usual negligence tort actions and those actions
brought under the Illinois Act for consequential damages.
65. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wagon, 309 Ill. App. 143, 33 N.E.2d 151 (1941).
66. See Danot v. Osborne, 11 Ill. 2d 77, 142 N.E.2d 20 (1957); Economy Auto
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 Ill. App. 579, 79 N.E.2d 854 (1948).
67. Jones v. Keilbach, 295 Ill. App. 598, 15 N.E.2d 618 (1938).
68. 99 Me. 364, 59 At. 442 (1904). See also Kiriluk v. Cohn, 16 Ill. App.
2d 385 (1958).
69. 83 Ill. 56 (1876).
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second factor for consideration by the courts, i.e., provocation reasonably
caused by the intoxication, in the case of Danhoff v. Osborne70 the court,
in denying recovery against the tavernkeeper, held that the third person
was prompted to assault and injure the plaintiff's husband due to the latter's
illicit affair with the former's wife, rather than by the intoxication of the
plaintiff's husband. Also, in the Schugart case7 1 the court pointed out that
it could not be said that the plaintiff's husband would not have insulted
the third party if he were not intoxicated nor could it be said that the
third party would not have stabbed the plaintiff's husband if the latter
had not menaced him. On the other hand, in the Currier case 72 the court
supported the recovery against the tavernkeeper by pointing out that
the facts indicated that the plaintiff's husband would not have attacked
the third person unless the former were intoxicated. Concerning the third
factor in the court's determination of liability, it is only reasonable that
the tavernkeeper should be liable for only those injuries naturally resulting
from the assault of the third party even though this assault is found to
have been caused by the intoxication. In the case of Schmidt v. Mitchell,73
the court followed this reasoning where the plaintiff's husband had received
a slight leg wound when assaulted by a third person and the leg was then
mistakenly amputated and the husband died as a result of the amputation.
The court did not allow recovery from the tavernkeeper.
3. Consequential Injuries-"Means of Support."
However, even if the above factors are used in analyzing these assault
cases, it is evident that the courts are so liberal in deciding "means of
support" cases that on occasion they even exceed the bounds of these
broad considerations. For example, in the case of Thompson v. Wagon,74
the plaintiff's wife was allowed recovery against the tavernkeeper when
her intoxicated husband was injured by an assault of a third person and
the wrongful quality of the assault was evidenced by the fact that in a
prior civil suit the husband had recovered a judgment against the third
person for the assault. Perhaps the decision in this case can be explained
by the fact that the third person was an agent of the tavernkeeper, since
courts are quite lenient when the third person is the tavernkeeper or his
agent, as is illustrated in the case of Haw v. 1933 Grill Inc.75 In that case,
the court, in granting recovery, held that it was foreseeable that when
the tavernkeeper served the plaintiff's husband and caused his intoxication
that the intoxicated husband would become boisterous and have to be
removed from the bar and therefore, the defendant should be liable for
injury to this plaintiff's "means of support" suffered in his removal.
70. 11 Ill. 2d 77, 142 N.E.2d 20 (1957).
71. 83 Ill. 56 (1876).
72. 99 Me. 364, 59 At. 442 (1904).
73. 84 Ill. 195 (1876).
74. 309 Ill. App. 413, 33 N.E.2d 151 (1941).
75. 297 Ill. App. 37, 17 N.E.2d 70 (1938).
[VOL. 4
54
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss4/3
SUMMER 1959]
This favorable treatment by the courts in actions under the civil
liability statutes is also shown in other situations which result in recovery
for injuries to the "means of support." 76 However, favorable treatment of
"means of support" actions is not limited to the courts since the acts
themselves offer preferred treatment. The Oklahoma statute"7 provides
that in an action for loss of support, the plaintiff need only prove that the
defendant furnished intoxicating liquor of any kind to the patron who be-
came intoxicated during the time when the cause of action for loss of
support accrued. In 1955, the Dram Shop Act of Illinois7s was amended
and the provision for injuries "in consequence" of the patron's intoxica-
tion was removed except that a provision was retained for such actions
in the case of injuries to "means of support". In addition, the maximum
recovery in these actions for injuries to "means of support" under the
act is twenty thousand dollars whereas the maximum for all other types
of actions, under the act is fifteen thousand dollars. However, the excep-
tion to this tendency for favoritism appears to be the Rhode Island act 79
in that it does not even provide for actions for loss of "means of support".
However, this statute does not provide for any type of action for injuries
"in consequence" of the intoxication of the intoxicated person.
Certainly'no one wishes to see the innocent members of an intoxicated
person's family or those whom he supports suffer due to loss of their
"means of support." On the other hand there is the tavernkeeper to be
considered, whose burden of doing business increases each time the
statutes are made more lenient as to the requirements of causation in these
"means of support" cases. His burden also increases each time the courts
become more liberal in finding sufficient causation to allow recovery. Once
again the observation must be made that the tavernkeeper comes nearer
and nearer to becoming an insurer under the Civil Liability Acts.
III.
CONCLUSION.
In view of the above discussion, it is seen that all of the parties in
the hypothetical situation which was proposed earlier would have a right
of action under the Civil Liability Acts of most states.80 The classification
of most of the injuries would be "by" the intoxicated person and hence
under most statutes there would be no question of proximate causation
between the intoxication of X and the resulting injuries. Also, since
each of the tavernkeepers served X then each of them would be liable
not only jointly but severally for all the injuries.
76. See, e.g., the cases involving the suicide of the plaintiff's "means of support."
Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751 (1950).
77. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (1954).
78. ILL. Rzv. STAT. c. 43, § 135 (1957). See 51 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 775 (1957). See
also Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 53-224 (1945).
79. G8N.. LAWS ov R.I. § 3-1-5 (1956).
80. See statutes cited note 15 supra.
COMMENTS
55
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Most of the civil liability statutes were passed in the nineteenth
century8l and at that time the chief concern was the consequential injuries
such as loss of work from intoxication. There were relatively few injuries
that could be classified as occurring due to the affirmative act of the
intoxicated person. However, the situation has changed and with the
advent of the automobile more and more injuries occur directly from the
acts of the intoxicated person. Perhaps this condition alone is sufficient
to prompt the legislatures and courts to review this question of causation
under the acts.
The Civil Liability Acts not only provided the right to recover against
the tavernkeeper in modifying the common law but perhaps went too far
in the scope of this recovery. The recovery went much further than pro-
viding merely a vicarious liability for the torts of the intoxicated person.
In these actions upon injuries caused by the intoxicated patron, not only
is the tavernkeeper deprived of any defense of contributory negligence
against the plaintiff, he also cannot rely on the defense that the intoxica-
tion was not the proximate cause of the injuries, which defense would
be present for the intoxicated person. In addition, as a result of the courts'
interpretation of these statutes, upon the tavernkeeper merely serving
one or two drinks he may be held to have contributed to the intoxication
and be subjected to liability for the resulting injuries.
It was not the purpose of this Comment to discuss the sociological
question of whether any tavernkeeper should be expected to bear the loss
for any and all injuries, resulting from the liquor traffic. However, upon
reviewing the question of causation under these 'Civil Liability Acts it
is found that he has become almost an absolute insurer under them. If
it were desirious that the liability among tavernkeepers be apportioned
more closely as to fault perhaps it would be better to require a showing
of substantial contribution to the intoxication or a foreseeability that in-
toxication was taking place or had taken place before a tavernkeeper
could be held to have caused the intoxication. As to the question of
causation between the intoxication and the resulting injuries it could rea-
sonably be required that proximate causation must be shown before re-
covery for any class of injuries could be had from any tavernkeeper. By
these suggested modifications a concept based on fault would certainly
be injected into the statutes and thereby the tavernkeepers would be liable
for only those injuries that could be held to have been caused by the liquor
traffic. Furthermore, within the tavern business itself, the liability for those
injuries which it is felt that the trade should bear would fall only on those
tavernkeepers with whom the fault lies.
R. L. Brabson
81. See list of citations of the state statutes of fourteen jurisdictions which
had civil liability acts as of 1888 in Osborn, Liquor Statutes in United States, 2
HARV. L. Rxv. 125, 134n. (1888).
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